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MR. JUSTICE WILLIAM JOHNSON AND THE
COMMON INCIDENTS OF LIFE: II*

A. J. Levint

VII
J OHNsoN's CREATIVE AND PosITIVE METHOD MADE PossIBLE
GIVING EFFECT TO COMMON INCIDENTS OF LIFE

BY

A. The Ambivalence of the Literal and Non-Literal
ERE must be the key to Johnson's constitutional jurisprudence,
which time, and the e:ffect of the repression of Marshall's domination has obscured. The dynamic pattern of his thought is, however,
unmistakable when analyzed without the burden of prepossession.
There can be little meaning to what Johnson said in Ogden ~- Saunders
unless conceived in relation to Johnson's whole approach to man and
society and his repeated insistence upon "that comt1U1,nication of
thought and experiment without which nofhing human can advance
in improvement." 115 Otherwise, we are unable to reconcile his repeated
dwelling upon the literal meaning of words and their "technical signification," 116 and his complaints about the careless use of language
with the very critical statement that "a great part of the difficulties of
the cause, arise from .not giving sufficient weight to the general intent
of this clause [ the contract clause] in the constitution, and subjecting
it to a severe literal construction, which would be better adapted to
special pleadings." 117 Johnson has himself elaborated on this thesis
by his characteristic factual references to the common incidents which
are applicable to such a situation:
" ... But to assign to contracts, universally, a literal purport,
and to exact for them a rigid literal fulfillment, could not have
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The first installment of this article appeared in the August issue, 44 MICH.
L. REV. (1945).
Member of (Detroit) Michigan Bar. A.B., J.D., University of Michigan;
author, "Mr. Justice William Johnson and the Unenviable Dilemma," 42 MICH. L.
REV. 803 (1944); "Mr. Justice William Johnson, Creative Dissenter," 43 MICH. L.
REv. 497 ( 1944); and other articles in this and other legal periodicals.-Ed.
115
See Levin, "Mr. Justice William Johnson, Creative Dissenter," 43 MICH. L.
REv. 497 at 540 (1944), quoting from Nugae Georgicae.
116
See Levin, "Mr. Justice William Johnson and the Unenviable Dilemma," 42
MICH. L. REV. 803 at 812 et seq. (1944).
117 Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. (24 U.S.) 213 at 286 (1827). This excerpt
is. quoted by Chief Justice Hughes in Home Building and Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell,
290 U.S. 398 at 428, 54 S.Ct. 231 (1934).
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been the intent of the constitution. It is repelled by a hundred
examples. Societies exercise a positive control a~ well over the
inception, construction and fulfillment of contracts, as over the
form and measure of the remedy to enforce them. As instances
of the first, take the contract imputed to the· drawer of a bill,
or indorser of a note, with its modifications; the deviations of the
law from the literal contract of the parties to a penal bond,
a mortgage, a policy of insurance, bottomry-bond, and various
others that might be enumerated. And for instances of discretion
exercised in applying the remedy, take the time for which executors are exempted from suit; the exemption of members of legislatures; of judges; of persons attending courts, or going to
elections; the preferences given in the marshaling of assets;
sales on credit for a present debt; shutting of courts altogether
against gaming debts and usurious. contracts, and above all, acts
of limitation. I hold it impossible to maintain the constitutionality
of an act of limitation, if the modification of the remedy against
debtors, implied in the discharge of insolvents, is unconstitutional.
I have seen no distinction between the cases that can bear examination." 118
What Johnson is saying here is that private contracts should not
be considered as more fixed or absolute or final than the parties themselves have considered them through the ages. The common law and
the statutory law, because of policy and public interest-usually invoked by the parties-had continually affected their origin and repeatedly subjected them to modification and change. The multiplica,tion of legal rules and defenses had given a relative aspect to contracts
which was a matter of experience and not of theory. If, from the
dynamic viewpoint, some contracts are in fact relative, if parties can
hire lawyers to defend against their enforceability, if they are in fact
subject to myriads of variations arising out of matters of proof, procedure and effect, then these, and no others, are the contracts upon
which the constitution must operate. To narrow the definition of contract by excluding what everyone had understood a contract to embrace, and to adopt the conception of a contract which existed only
as an imaginative abstraction and to rule out the common incidents
of life, could not have been the purpose of the. fra,riers of the Constitution.
Such an outlook upon constitutional law portends an effort to
attain an inherent harmony between private law and constitutional
118

12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 213 at 285 (1827).
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government in which the psychodynamic facts of one are related and
integrated with the other. The discordant clash of difference where
no difference exists is dismissed and in its place we find a psychological
synthesis, inevitable as a course of direction in civilized society. It was
novel; and so it remains. Marshall did not adopt it and the present
Supreme Court does not follow it. Yet its ultimate recognition seems
unavoidable.

B. Johnson's Recognition of the Constitutional Protection
of Contracts
Yet, one may not say, as might appear justifiable on the surface,
that Johnson believed that private contracts could be disregarded.
There is no inconsistency or inadvertence in his statement found in
Livingston's Lessee v. Moore, where he said, in a suit involving a
change in statute affecting the method of selling lands for default
of lien:
" ... the one is the right, the other is the remedy; the one
constitutes the contract, and the other the remedy afforded by the
policy of the country, where it is not provided by the terms of
the contract, for enforcing or effecting the execution of it. The
. first is unchangeable, without a violation of right; the other may
be subject to change, at the will of the government." 119
119

7 Pet. (32 U.S.) 469 at 550. (Italics the writer's.) The writer does not
share the view of Robert L. Hale that this statement of the protection of the Constitution over contracts was an inadvertence. Hale, "The Supreme Court and the
Contract Clause: III," 57 HARV. L. REv. 852 at 875, note 374 (1944), Johnson
concurred without an opinion in the case of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 518 (1819) considered by some the most important case
in our constitutional history. The charter of the college was held to have been impaired.
It is difficult, except by analyzing his other expressions and opinions, to determine exactly what transpired to cause Johnson to concur in the Dartmouth College
decision for "the reasons stated by the Chief Justice." Haines suggests that the conferences with Justice Kent and discussions over the contract clause in Sturges v.
Croninshield "probably had some influence in determining Johnson's final vote."
HAINES, THE RoLE OF THE SUPREME CoURT IN AMERICAN GovERNMENT AND
POLITICS 1789-1835, 401 (1944). To such a view we must demur, since it is based
upon the vaguest inference of personal influence. If we examine the subject matter
we may perhaps, conjecture two things. First, we may infer that Johnson, who opposed
too literal an interpretation of the word "contract" in the Constitution in order not
to proscribe the necessary functions of government, saw no reason for becoming more
literal when recognition of a contract was involved. And, secondly, we may infer that
he considered the legislation as a high-handed act of government on the border-line
of unrestrained parliamentary despotism. The very fact that Parliament could have
repealed the charter was reason for Johnson to consider such unrestrained right as
reminiscent of the early attempts at repeal of colonial charters and the part this played
in the American Revolution. But see id. 406.
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Johnson never really swerved from the opinion that once a contract
was found to exist and its terms were determined, it could not be
altered! But what is important, though not so easily discernible, is
that he did differ in the evaluation of the incidents, the evidence, the
facts and the attendant circumstances, all of which would determine
the scope of the enforceable terms. Much judicial agony could have
been saved by adherence to this simpie and sound approach. Johnson
did not favor, as he said in Fletcher v. Peck, giving the contract clause
the "general effect of a restriction of the state powers in favor of
private rights" but this did not imply that private rights were to be
overlooked or disavowed; What he asked for was a jurisprudence
which would factually, in the face of all the common incidents of life,
determine the scope of the private contract for which the parties had
a right to expect protection from the state. With Marshall, constitutional jurisprudence started with the constitution and worked back to
private rights and contracts. Johnson, however, insisted on the reverse,
namely, that we begin with private rights and contracts, proceed to
determine their scope and then apply the constitution to prevent an
impairme_nt !
Thus, to take a very simple case, if the state has in the first instance
declared that certain contracts cannot be entered into, there can be
no impairment. This, too, Johnson illustrated in his typical style of
citing examples from the common incidents of life:
"Why may not the community set bounds to the will of
the contracting parties in this, as in every other instance? That
will is controlled in the instances of gaming debts, usurious contracts, marriage-brokage bonds, and various others; and why
may not the community also declare, that, 'look to what you will,
no contract formed within the territory which we govern shall
be valid as against future acquisitions; we have an interest in the
happiness, and services, and families of this community, which
shall not be superseded by individual views'? Who can doubt
the power of the state to prohibit her citizens from running in
debt altogether? A measure a thousand times wiser than that
impulse to speculation and ruin, which has hitherto been communicated to individuals by our public policy. And if to be prohibited altogether, where is the limit which may not be set both
to the acts and the views of the contracting parties?" 120
We can now better understand why Johnson said in Gibbons v.
0 gden that the "simple, classical, precise, yet comprehensive language
120

12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 213 at 289 (1827).
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in which it [ the Constitution] is couched, leaves, at most, but very
little latitude for construction. . . . " 121 And it is at this very point
that the methods of Johnson and Marshall and Holmes and his followers part company. Holmes warned against "the dangers of a
delusive exactness" in the application of the Fourteenth Amendment
and spoke of a word as "the skin of a living thought" which "may
vary greatly in color and in content according to the circumstances and
the time in which it is used"---although he frowned, it is true, upon
overstraining language to accomplish specific objectives. Johnson, more
psychologically correct, disavowed any judicial tampering with the
Constitution itself. There was no ·need to stretch the words of the
Constitution to accomplish its adaptation to events because the events
actually adapt themselves to the words of the Constitution. There are
limits, of course, but these limits are the limits of what people agree
upon. Johnson viewed the word "contract" in the Constitution as the
then current result of continual modifications by legislative fiat and
judicial decisions. This had been accomplished as a consequence of
the pleas of individuals, either acting as "pressure groups," as we call
them today, or by the actions of private litigants in their suits and
defenses. The public policy surrounding any complex idea such as
"contract" was forged out of the aggressive supplications of individuals
asking for help from the society which denied self-help to them. These
applicants for public aid of legislature or court sought to integrate
their demands with the public protection and, if necessary, with the
public interest. One may ask, therefore, what would be the attitude
of the Supreme Court if the separate notion of contract swung back
to its tort origins? The answer is not imminently required; but the
dynamic aspect of the question is, because it deals with processes and
not merely with symbols.
It requir~ a palpable fiction to say that the framers of the Constitution envisaged the coming of the automobile. The words do not
ever change their original meaning in fact and, indeed, cannot do so
any more than the memory trace of an individual can change in the
course of time. The prevailing idea of a floating authority which
changes retrospectively is psychologically as unreal as a fantasy. The
error is in assuming that words are ever meant to be isolated symbols,
rooted in the concept of past time and remote from the common incidents of the life surrounding them. What is psychologically true is
that the simple words of the Constitution are applied and related to
subsequent changing events. The artificial notion of "police power"
121

See Levin, "Mr. Justice William Johnson and the Unenviable Dilemma," 42
M1cH. L. REv. 803 at 816 (1944).
\
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would not be required under Johnson's view of the subject, since the
determination that a confract existed, after considering aII of the common and applicable incidents, would dispose of the need for the artificial notion of a reserve of state power. The living parties have the
capacity to change, but they are unable, except through an introspective
inversion, to change what was said over a century and a half ago. In
any attempt to understand the dynamics of thought one must be prepared for opposites. Thus, we find that the very justices who opposed
the interpretations sought by Justice Holmes were psychologicaIIy
sound and unimpeachable in their insistence that words do not grow
. retroactively or forwards. Once the words are written or uttered they
have spent their original force; but that does not mean that they must
remain unuseable means of communication. The error of these justices
lay principaily in their unwiIIingness to recognize the variability of
contemporary facts and circumstances, in their failure to give effect to
the common incidents of life, in their strong attachment to the isolated
original application of the words. They were introspective jurists because they had incorporated the words within themselves mentaliy so
that the application and effect of the words had become highly personalized.
It is quite beside the point to indulge in the further customary
judicial worry about the vagueness of such words as "due process of
law" or "contract" or "equal protection of the laws." There are few
-words which can be used as general outlines of purpose and at the
same time retain a particularized meaning. Yet the meaning of general
words may be "simple," as Johnson pointed out. The ambiguities which
should chaIIenge the mind of the jurist are p.ot caused by these vaguenesses but rather by the interaction of language, laws, events and experience and their reciprocal effects. Ambiguity, we have elsewhere
pointed out, is not merely a phenomenon of'language. It is a characteristic of aII experience. It is the ambiguity of experience, then, which
gives rise to legal ambiguity or any kind of uncertainty. The effect of
the word "contract" as used in the Constitution may produce new
results for the same reason that defenses have from time to time grown
up to bar the plaintiff's recovery on a contract which he originally may
have thought inviolable. This is what Johnson means when he insists
that the woi:d should not be given too literal a meaning.

C. Emergencies as Integrated Common Incidents of Life
We have already dwelt in general terms upon some of the mani..,.
festations of emergency in society. We have also seen that Johnson
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had little respect for "legal subtleties" when society was confronted
with grave problems. We also suggested that Johnson "would hardly
have created a new category out of an emergency." This statement
becomes pertinent because it has been said that Chief Justice Hughes
"adopted Johnson's approach to the question" 122 in the now famous
case of Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell 1 23 which held
valid the Minnesota mortgage moratorium law because of the great
economic emergency which existed at the time. The Chief Justice,
speaking for a divided Court, had, indeed, noticed the development
of a growing recognition that the contract clause should not be used
"as an instrument to throttle the capacity of the states to protect their
fundamental interests. This development is a,growth from the seeds
which the fathers planted. It is a development forecast by the prophetic
words of Justice Jo_hnson in Ogden v. Saunders .... " 124 However, an
analysis of Johnson's thinking reveals that he would surely have refrained from deciding the case upon the reasoning resorted to by the
Chief Justice, that is, that an emergency does not create power but
may furnish the occasion for the exercise of power. There can be little
doubt, however, that Johnson would have cast his vote with the
majority.
Chief Justice Hughes reasoned that:
"Not only is the constitutional provision qualified by the
measure of control which the State retains over remedial processes,
but the State also continues to possess authority to safeguard the
vital interests of its people. It does not matter that legislation
appropriate to that end 'has the result of modifying or abrogating
contracts already in effect.' Stephenson 'V. Binford, 287 U.S. 251,
276. Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix
obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of essential
attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a
postulate of the "legal order. The policy of protecting contracts
against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of which contractual relations are worth while,- '
a government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace
and good order of society. This principle of·harmonizing the con1

122

Robert L. Hale, "The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause: III," 57
L. REv. 852 at 880 (1944).
128
290 U.S. 398, 54 S.Ct. 231 (1934). This is the same case referred to earlier.
124
Id. at 444. (Italics the writer's, except for case title.) The language referred
to is the reference to literality appearing on p. 243-244, preceding. See also dissenting
opinion of Justice Black in Wood v. Lovett, 313 U.S. 362 at 382, 61 S.Ct. 983
(1941).
HARV.
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stitutional prohibition with the necessary residuum of state power
has had progressive recognition in the decisions of this Court." 125
In fine, as the Chief Justice put it, "the principle of this development is . . . that the reservation of the reasonable exercise of the protective power of the State is read into all contracts and there is no
greater re'ason for refusing to apply this principle to Minnesota mortgages than to New York leases." 126 The process here is that of
- "harmonizing the constitutional provision with the necessary residuum
of state power." The price of harmonization is the retention of the
conventional and isolating conception of state power as dynamically
more potent than the government which holds all states together in
harmony. "Individual opportunity" and "individual rights," the most
valued aims -of a democracy, are thus attached, to ideas of force rather
than of function.
A constitution which must yield to emergencies could not have been
meant by the signers. It is difficult to conceive that the convention expecte,d that the basic charter of liberties should yield at every serious
challenge of new fact. Viewed psychologically, the fault with such a
notion of constitutional jurisprudence-is ~ot, as the critics would put it,
that it "takes us beyond the fixed and secure boundaries of the fundamental law into a precarious fringe of extraconstitutional territory in
which no real boundaries exist ...." 121 The Constitution was not intended as a fence and any idea of "boundaries" forces the analogy to
land which has been the source of some of the most serious misconceptions found in our jurisprudence. From the land analogy we easily
proceed to the psychodynamic error that every emergency is outside
of the domain of constitutional protection and that these emergencies
are each of them a break in the fence.
Nor is it more real to say that every contract contains within.itself
the power to annul itself when the emergency situation demands it.
It is one of the anomalies of our constitutional history that Chief Jus125

290 U.S. 398 at 434-435, 54 S.Ct. 231 (.1934). (Italics the writer's.)
Id. at 444. The New York lease cases referred to are: Marcus Brown Holding
Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170, 41 S.Ct. 465 (1921); Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co.
v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242, 42 S.Ct. 289 (1922) •.
127
From the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Sutherland in The Worthen
Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 at 435 (1933), quoted by Robert L. Hale, "The
Supreme Court and the Contract Clause: Ill," 57 HARV. L. REv. 852 at 885 (1944).
Mr. Justice Holmes, in his dissenting opinion in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312
at 342, 42 S.Ct. 124 (1921), found only delusive similarity in the land analogy:
"By calling a business 'property' you make it seem like land.
" (Italics the
writer's.)
,

126
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tice Hughes and those who preceded him failed to see that what Johnson was seeking was an interpretation of the Constitution which would
in practice function in all necessary situations. No question of the extent of the police power· troubled him; nor would he have considered
it a judicial function, if he had had his way, to determine whether a
statute is arbitrary because unre;sonable and, therefore, void. No more
difficult problem would have presented itself to his judicial mind than
the case of the interpretation of any contract where the facts largely
direct the result. Since judges, according to his view, were not concerned with the wisdom of legislation the prohibition should apply
to all situations. In effect the very same judges who deny that they
have a right to inquire into the wisdom of legislation actually do so
but rationalize their process and, thus, tend to encourage fictional thinking. There has already been too much emphasis on this circumstance.
without the effort to understand it. Those judges who are more firmly
committed to judicial review of legislation are more frank in aeknowledging what they are doing. Judicial review is needed at this
stage but not in the form in which it exists. The doctrine of Muller v.
Oregon, despite its advance, is still largely review by avoidance or
negation based upon subjective factors. Johnson would have determined what was arbitrary legislation as a fact question, namely, by
asking whether such type of legislation had been considered previously
as being in support of the public welfare. He would have found that
time and again labor legislation had in fact been enacted for the public
welfare in England; the fact that such legislation was almost always
in favor of the employer and restricted the liberty of the laborer would
not have presented any fact difference in kind. It would not have required a mental avulsion such as took place after Holmes came to the
Court to find that to enact legislation favoring improved conditions
for labor was not an impairmen:t of contract, since to enact such legislation was one of the common incidents of life.

D. Emergency as a Separate Category of Interpretation
More emphasis on the interpretation of the positive words of the
constitution such as "contract" or "property" and less anxiety about
the restrictive provisions would accomplish positively what is now done
by negation without the resultant psychological resistances.
There was no element of psychodynamic insincerity in Johnson's
method. He must have known that the "expansive power of the human
mind" would tomorrow treat as commonplaces what are today considered as emergencies. No constitution could function which would
I
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ignore either the changes which life continually undergoes or the
securities which men rely upon. Both are a part of the "common incidents of life." The growth of the human mind, however, has been
more often tested by its capacity to adjust to changes. It is the test of
maturity and civilization. An emergency, whether it be of a progressive
or regressive nature, presents a variant of daily experienced facts, but
emergencies are also matters of common experience. Govern!Jlents
must be capable of dealing with them, must expect them, and cannot
afford to be wholly surprised by them. Hence, Johnson would consider
that no contract which man could devise could exclude the possible
operation of such conditions.
There was no need for reservation or implication or reading the
police power into the contract. "It is, therefore, far from being true,
as a general proposition," he decared " 'that a government necessarily
violates the obligation of a contract, which it puts an end to, without
performance.' It is the motive, the policy, the object, that must characterize the legislative act, to affect it with the imputation of v1olating
the obligation of contracts." 128 What this means is, obviously, that
128

Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 213 at 291 (1827).
Mr. Justice Sutherland, often opposed to Justices Holmes and Brandeis, was
one of the few justices of the Supreme Court who clearly and repeatedly set out
in his opinions his approach to constitutional questions. Thus, in Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 at 387, 47 S.Ct. II4 at II8 (_1926) he asserted that
the meaning of constitutional guarantees never varies but that the "scope of their
application must expand or contract to meet the new or different conditions which
are constantly coming within the field of their operation. In a changing ·world, it is
impossible that it should be otherwise. But although a degree of elasticity is thus
imparted, not to the meaning but to the application of constitutional principles, statutes
and ordinances which, after giving due weight to the new conditions, are found clearly
not to conform to the Constitution, of course, must fall." Over a decade -ago the
writer pointed out in this magazine the surprising fact that Mr. Justice Sutherland
and Mr. Justice Brandeis, though often in disagreement, were, in agreement on the
-analysis as stated above by Mr. Justice Sutherland. In Burnet v. Coronado Oil and
Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 at 410, 52 S.Ct. 443 at 449 (1932), Mr. Justice Brandeis
asserted that in cases coming before the Supreme Court, "there is seldom any dispute
as to the interpretation of any provision. The controversy is usually over the application
to existing conditions of some well-recognized constitutional -limitation." See Levin,
"The Varying Meaning and Legal Effect of the Word 'Void,'" 32 MICH. L. REV.
1088 at 1113-u14 (1934). The writer is, therefore, unable to follow Haines' division of constitutional interpretation into two schools, the one strict and the other
liberal. The quotation given by Haines from Mr. Justice Sutherland's dissenting
opinion in Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 at 451,
54 S.Ct. 231 (1934), which is similar in import to the one above quoted, would not
be far afield from Johnson's attention to objects and motives and his concern
about discovering the effect of provisions in relation "to the actual subject."
See HAINES, THE RoLE oF THE SUPREME CoURT IN AMERICAN GoVERNMENT AND
POLITICS 1789-1835, 40 (1944); id. 31. The writer sees differences in result arising
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the investigations of "the motive, the policy, the object" are realitytesting researches. Accordingly, it is not the judge's wisdom whicb. is
the test but, rather, the judge's objective evaluation of facts. True, a
judge may confuse his own notions of right and wrong with his evaluation of the facts. This is a fault of personality; the correctness of the
method is not to be confused with the judge's lack of capacity. Nor is
the situation in this regard any different under the prevailing theories
of judicial review where the judges have the human quality of making
mistakes and do. In the rent cases or the moratorium case or ,in any
other emergency Johnson would not be expected, therefore, to seek
some rationalization for deviating from the Constitution, but rather
would have asked: Are these pressing facts and circumstances surrounding the contract common incidents of life? If they are, even though
they be considered emergencies, then legislation which attempts to
deal with them cannot be outside the boundaries of the Constitution,
for a government must deal with emergencies.
Contract rights are not violated in such case because contracts between private individuals have not, during the course of their history,
been considered as inviolate when confronted by such situations. Their
inception has been in an atmosphere which has always invoked the
aid of society at every step. Johnson, therefore, started with facts and
worked back to the Constitution. Other jurists considered the Constitution a matrix into which the facts must be patterned and, hence, there
was no room for emergency or deviation from prior experience. If the
word "contract" is invested with magical, primitive significance then,
indeed, humans will seek means of evasion by every exegetical device
known. The struggle with a formula, then, must go on. Johnson's
jurisprudence is psychologically correct. The alternative is open defiance of law or lawlessness under the guise of law, as we have seen
many times in our turbulent history. "If nothing should ever be done
but what is according to law," said Oliver Cromwell, "the throat of
the nation may be cut, while we send for someone to make a law" 129
and, again, that it was for ordinary governments to live within the
law and "if a Government in extraordinary circumstances go beyond
most often from Justice Sutherland's introspective attitude causing him to restrict
the facts related to the application of the language as opposed to the greater attention
which Justice Brandeis. gave to new facts. It is one thing to say that new facts are
to be recognized and still another, psychologically, to admit the new facts and thus to
maintain a dynamic attitude toward the admission of evidence and actually to carry out
such a tenet.
129

MARY TAYLOR BLAUVELT, OLIVER CROMWELL 250

(1937).
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the law, it should not be clamoured at or blottered out." 180 This dealing with vital problems on an emergency basis has in large measure
been due to our failure to apply any science of the human mind toward
-the solution of our daily human problems. This reliance on mental
antiquities in the most important of all branches of knowl!=dge remains
one of the most curious facts in all civilizations. That the causes for
this situation will be found in the further researches into the psychodynamic origins and bases of communication and their distortion need
no longer be considered a conjecture.

E. -Johnson's Application of the Method of Observation and
Discrimination
Johnson's ability to locate dynamic similarities in legal situations
and his willingness to recognize them at all costs, it must be repeated
again, is unique in American jurisprudence. Yet, he did not attempt
to force findings into situations which might appear to warrant
application, tempting as this might be in a particular case. In Fullerton
'V. Bank of the United States a practice for proceeding on promissory
notes had been adopted by the United States circuit courts for Ohio
and acted upon for a period of eight years and had been "properly
treated as a part of the law of that court."· The note bore a date prior
to the passage of the law. Johnson was careful; "this certainly presents
a question which is always to be approached with due precaution, to
wit, the extent of legislative power over existing contracts." However,
the act had beep. passed for the relief of the defendant and the Court
had power to adopt it: "The circuit court has incorporated the action,
with all its incidents, into its course of practice.... " The liabilities
of the defendants under their contract had not been ·"increased, or
even varied; and as to change in the mere form of the remedy, the
doctrine cannot be maintained, that this is forbidden to the legislative
power, or to the tribunal itself, when vested with full power to regulate its own practice." 131 Notwithstanding his aversion to ex post facto
legislation an~ retrospective laws of any kind and his reluctance to
turn the clock back, whether in the case of precedent-worship or adulation of the classical or in other instances, he did not consider every
readjustment of present events by legislative act or court practice as
180
Id. 252. Mr. Justice Patterson, in Penhallow v. Doane's Administrators, 3
Dallas (3 U.S.) 54 at ~o (1795), said: "The powers of congress were revolutionary
in nature, arising out of events, adequate to every national ,emergency, and co-extensive
with the object to be attained." Quoted by HAINES, THE RoLE OF THE SUPREME
CouRT IN AMERICAN GovERNMENT AND PoLIT1cs 1789-1835, 139 (1944).
181
1 Pet. (26 U.S.) 604 at 615 (1828).
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a forbidden retroactivity. Here was not a case of looking back, or retroacting as in Fletcher 'V. Peck; for the agency which had the power to
regulate its practice could do so even though some expectations might
have to be changed and some assumptions as to the vested right in the
status quo might have to be revised.
Earlier in the same year, Johnson had filed an opinion "dissentiente'' on a question of practice in Doe 'V. Grymes,122 where he felt to
hold otherwise would approach very near to ex post facto legislation.
The majority of the Court had held that the circuit courts of the United
States had no authority to issue a peremptory nonsuit against the will of
the plaintiff in an action before a jury. Johnson insisted on recognizing
the practice of the sixth circuit, from which the cause came up, which
was that if, after plaintiff had closed his evidence, defendant introduced evidence, it was too late to move for a nonsuit. Here again, as in
Fletcher 'V. Peck, it would be a case of undoing. "This court can alter
the practice by a rule, but, to overturn a judgment that has already
been rendered under such a practice, I must respectfully contend, approaches very near to ex post facto legislation, not adjudication .... " 133 Here, also, he strikes out against what seems to be an
evasion and insists on seeing the reality of the effect of what was
attempted. "In point of convenience and expedition, in.the administration of justice," he asserted, "I presume, there cannot be two
opinions." 184 To the precedent of the English practice, which was
urged to the contrary of his view of the subject, he countered sharply,
"England is not altogether absolute in dictating to the Courts of the
United States, and if those of the states of the sixth circuit have
asserted some independence in their rules of practice on this subject,
I presume, their right was unquestionable to do so." 185
182

I Pet. (26 U.S.) 469, 472 (1828).
Id. at 473. (Italics the writer's.)
is4 Id. at 473.
Since Johnson said that he held the doctrine that the remedy is ingrafted into
the contract untenable and "infinitely more restrictive on State power than the
doctrine contended for by the opposite party," the writer does not attach to the following sentences any indication of the adoption of any idea of the implication of the
police power: "Whenever an individual enters into a contract, I think his assent is
to be inferred, to abide by those rules in the administration of justice which belong
to the jurisprudence of the country of the contract. And when compelled to pursue
his debtor in other states, he is equally bound to acquiesce in the law of the forum
to which he subjects himself. The law of the contract remains the same everywhere,
and it will be the same in every tribunal; but the remedy necessarily varies, and with
it the effect of the constitutional pledge, which can only have relation to the laws of
distributive justice known to the policy of each state severally .•." 12 Wheat. (25 U.S.)
213 at 285 (1827).
1sn Id. at 473.
188
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He was reluctant to render "a decision in the teeth of positive
fact'' 136 just as in Green v. Biddle he had called attention to the need
to adhere to "sensible objects." 131 We have no way of knowing whether
he recalled or had even read Jeremy Bentham's proposition that all
psychological ideas have their root in physical ones and that "to legislate is an affair of observation and calculation; according to the ascetics,
it is an affair of-fanaticism.... " 188 We do know, however, that Johnson was not only receptive to such influence but that he himself made
observation of fact the nucleus of all of his thinking, and that he referred back to the common facts (incidents) of life at every stage.
Many years later Justice Holmes startled a somnolent jurisprudence
with the now seemingly obvious statement that "all that life offers
any man from which to start his thinking or his striving is a fact."

F. Further Examination of the Method in Private Contracts
We have seen that in Ogden v. Saunders in 1823 Johnson declared
that in determining whether a statute violates the obligation of contract, "It is the motive, the policy, the object, that must characterize
the legislative act, to affect it with the imputation of violating the
obligation of contracts." Thus, constitutional questions perforce raise
questions of degree. Yet, in Maryland Insurance Co. v. Leroy 139 the
insured was denied recovery on a marine policy because additional
cargo had been taken on at the Isle of Fogo consisting of four jackasses. The terms of the policy, it was held, which permitted "touching
at the Cape de Verd Island ... for stock, qnd to take in water" could
mean no more than permission to provision the vessel with live stock
such as is usual on a voyage and may be procured at the Cape de Verds.
:Voluntary deviation, according to Johnson, did not admit of degrees!
But, surprisingly enough, upon examination, the dynamics of this case
of a private insurance contract. does not reveal any departure from the
application of the attitudes he expressed earlier and later on constitutional questions. The court must look to the factual attendant circum- ,
· stances 'to determine how the contract was to operate. Once the nature
of the maritime business, as it was practiced in those hazardous days
of conflict on the high seas, was examined, it became apparent that
there was no room for degrees of deviation:
136

Id. at 473. (Italics the writer's.)
8 Wheat. (21 U.S.) I at 101 (1823). (Italics the writer's.)
138 BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION IO (1931). (Italics the writer's.)
189
7 Cranch (II U.S.) 26 (1812).
137
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" ... It might, indeed, admit of a doubt, whether any of the
larger animals used for food were included within the policy. The
words of the first offer certainly were intended to confine the permission to the smaller animals. Stock is a term of the most general
import. In its present extended application it would include a
great variety of subjects that never could have entered into contemplation of the parties.
"In what sense was the term used? is the question to be decided: not with uses it might have been applied to in other contracts, or between other parties. The general want of precision
in the language of maritime contracts, is an endless source of litigation among mercantile men. Courts of justice are, therefore,
obliged to resort to such reasons as the nature, object and terms
of the contract present, to determine the precise extent of the
obligation of the parties.
"We feel no inclination to add to the number of causes which
vitiate a policy; but the amount of the premium depends upon
such a variety of considerations ( as often suggested by caprice as
by judgment), that the contract, whatever it is must be substantially adhered to." 140
The "nature, object and terms" which Johnson, in 1812, found
to govern a private contract are surely the psychodynamic equivalents
of the "motive, policy and object" which appear in his constitutional
jurisprudence in 1827. These are the elements which measure "obligation!"
In 1828, a year after the Ogden v. Saunders case, the correlation
between Johnson's analysis of private contracts and the interpretation
of the Constitution is again illustrated by what he said in his opinion
in another insurance case. The case of Buck & Hedrick v. Chesapeake
Insurance Company was a suit to recover on a policy where the vessel
had been totally lost by the perils of the sea. Here recovery was allowed. The decision grew, as Johnson analyzed the situation, out of a
contextual consideration of many things which were not written into
the policy but which the insurance company knew wer~ inherent in.
the situation. Facts-the course and incidents of trade--determined
the result:
"Whatever turn of expression may be given- to the question,
or in whatever aspect it may be presented, it is obviously, at last,
no more than the simple question, have these underwriters been
entrapped, or imposed upon, or. seduced into a contract, of the
140

Id. at 31. (Italics the writer's.)
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force, extent, or incidents of which, a competent understanding
cannot be imputed to them?
"A knowledge of the state of the world, of the allegiance of
particular countries, of the risks and embarrassments a:ffecting
their commerce, of the course and incidents of the trade on which
they insure, and the established import of the terms used in their
contract; must necessarily be imputed to underwriters .... 'And
what is usually done by such a ship, with such a cargo, in such a
voyage, is understood to be referred to by every policy.' Hence,
when a neutral, carrying on a trade from a belligerent to a neutral
country, asks for insurance 'for whom it may concern,' it is an
awakening circumstance. No underwriter can be ignorant of the
practice of neutrals to cover belligerent property, under neutral
names, or of the precautions ordinarily resorted to, that the cover
may escape detection. The cloak must be thrown over the whole
transaction, and in no part is it more necessary than in the correspondence by other vessels so often overhauled by an enemy,
for the very purpose of detecting covers on other cargoes. Letters,
thus intercepted, have often been the ground-work of condemnation in admiralty courts; and underwriters, to whom the extension of trade is always beneficial, must and do connive at the practice, in silence. They ask no questions, propose their premiums,
and the contract is as well understood, as the most thorough ex·
planation can 'make it." m
m I Peters (26 U.S.) 151 at 160 (1828).
Much of the early jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States
was concerned with prize cases and the related subject of maritime insurance which
raised .many questions arising out of capture and other maritime hazards. That Johnson became well versed in the subject of admirality is attested by a number of his
most vigorous opinions. Though he fought vehemently the extension of the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts because of their virtual annulment of common law
procedures he must have become aware of the very direct way the prize courts had
of dealing with litigation and litigants. T!i,e reporter, Wheaton, tells us, for example,
that a Prize Court exerted its authority over all the incidents of a cause once it
acquired jurisdiction; it had exclusive jurisdiction to determine who were the captors,
and who entitled to share of distribution, and their decree was conclusive; the Prize
Court "will not only entertain suits for restitution, and damages in cases of wrongful
capture, and award damages therefor; but it will also allow damages for all personal
torts, and that, upon a proper case laid before the court, as a mere incident to the
possession of the principal cause." The Prize Court did not confine itself to the actual
wrong-doer but went on to apply the rule of respondeat, superior and to decree
damages against the owners of an offending privateer. "In short," Wheaton sums up,
"the court is the constitutional guardian of-the public interests in relation to matters
of prize•.•• " Additional Note on the Principles and Practice in Prize Causes, 2
Wheat. (15 U.S.) APP. pp. 3-6. See also Marine Insurance Co. of Alexandria v.
Tucker, 3 Cranch (7 U.S.) ·357 at 384.
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It was because Johnson was so sensitive to the variables which
might arise in almost any contractural situation, and which the parties
were ready to use to advantage, that he insisted on adherence to the
unequivocal terms when they were found present. It was not the
judicial function to change what the government or the parties had
clearly expressed. The clamor of the parties, whether emanating from
the insurer or the insured, as to the commercial importance of a particular interpretation was not to be the deciding factor where the
language was clear. So, in Gracie v. Palmer,m which was a suit on a
charter party contract, he merely took note that "very strong views
have been presented of the injuries that might be sustained, by foreign
shippers, on the one hand, and by ship-owners, on the other, as the one
or the other alternative of the stated case shall obtain the sanction of
this court. But it is obvious, that most, if not all of these suggestions,
have been the offspring of a zealous, rather than a calm, survey of
possible consequences." m He found the contract to be only a partial
expression of the wish of the parties. This was a_ common fault in
nearly all written instruments, be they contracts, statutes or constitutions. "The contract of affreightment, like every other contract, is the
creature of the will of the contracting parties. It may be varied to
infinity, and easily adapted to the exigencies of either party, or of any
trade. It is only where the express contract is silent, that the implied
contract can arise." ut

VIII
JoHNsoN's INSISTENCE THAT WoRDs "CoNTRACT" AND "OBLIGATION"
Do NOT EMBRACE "FUNDAMENTAL LAws"

A. Tendency of Literal Meaning of These Words to Pre-empt
State Function
Thus, we see, the dynamics of Johnson's constitutional law arose
out of the experiences of individual behavior. Whether it was a contract,
a statute or a constitution which was involved made little difference
so far as method was concerned. He accepted the idea that a constitution was itself "a social compact," an expression which he employs on
a number of occasions.145 But he differed also from his brethren on the
bench in his repeated insistence that not everything fell within the
m 8 Wheat. (21 U.S.) 605 (1823).
us Id. at 633.
u 4 1_d. at 634. (Italics the writer's.)
145

See, for example, Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,
373 (1816).

I

Wheat. (14 U.S.) 304 at
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w°'ords "contract" or "obligation." The effect of such a difference is
enormous. It immediately excludes Chief Justice Hughes' •idea that
existing laws must be read into contracts in order to fix obligations between the parties, and excludes also the idea of a residuum of state
power. Both of these ideas appear artificial in the light of Johnson's
more direct view that a contract or obligation cannot ignore the functioning of government. Such a result can only be brought about by
·too literal an interpretation of these words.
This is certainly suggested in Fletcher v. Peck. Later, in Green v.
Biddle, he cautioned against embracing in the term "contract" those
"fundamental laws" which did not require such support since this
would be putting "a fifth wheel to the carriage." 146 Shortly before his
death, in Livingston v. Moore-one of the last cases in which he wrote
an opinion-he reiterated the objection which he had pressed so many
times before to what he considered as "obviou.sly an attempt to give
the character of a contract to that which is nothing more than an obligation, or duty, or necessity imposed by the laws of society. The confession of a judgment does indeed create a contract; but it is only on the
side of the defendant, who thus acknowledges or assumes up9n himself
· a debt, which may be made the ground of an action. But on the side
of the ·plaintiff, the necessity of resorting to certain means of enforcing
that judgment, is not an obligation arising out of contract, but one imposed upon him by the laws of the country." 147
We repeat again that we are unable to agree, therefore, with the
thesis that Johnson approved of subordinating contract rights "to other
interests which it is equally the policy of the Constitution to protect" 148
146

8 Wheat. (21 U.S.) I at 97 (1820).
7 Pet. (32 U.S.) 469 at 550 (1833) •
. Although Johnson favored fixity of titles to property, as in the case of contracts,
Johnson also considered property rights as complex in origin and variable. This is
illustrated in the following excerpt from his opinion in Dawson's Lessee v. Godfrey,
4 Cranch (8 U.S.) 321 at 323 (1808): "Much of the difficulty in satisfying the
mind on this subject vanishes, upon a just view of the nature of the right of inheritance. Gentlemen have argued upon it as if it were a natural and perfect right;
whereas, it has its origin in, and is modified to infinity by, the law of society, in
exercise of the right of territorial jurisdiction. To be entitled to inherit in the state
of Maryland, a right should be made out, under the laws of that state. As the common
law, which is the law of Maryland on this subject, deprives an alien generally of the
right of inheriting, it is incumbent upon the. plaintiff, to establish some exception in
favor of his case. But I know of no exception, at common_ law, which gives tJie right
to inherit distinctly from the obligation of allegiance, existing either in fact or in
supposition of law." (Italics the writer's.)
148 Robert L. Hale, "The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause: III," 57
HARV. L. REv. 852 at 873, 892 (1944).
147
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because "the rights of all must be held in subserviency to the good
of the whole." 149 Johnson had said that it was not his intention to
"new-model" the Constitution. Hence, he had no alternative but to
give effect to the contract clause. What he contended for, first, with
much courage, was that the conception of the terms "contract" and
"obligation" was variable in application both in private law and constitutional law, and, secondly, that contract and obligations could not
preclude the ability of government to function. For example, in the
Lochner case which arose under the Fourteenth Amendment he would
have said, we believe, that the contract between the parties did not
and could not embrace the fundamental capacity of society to deal with
matters of duty or necessity arising out of the common incidents of
life. Other questions would then easily be disposed of. When we now
examine what Johnson said in Ogden v. Saunders we not only see
how it fits in with what he said about the obligation of contract in
Fletcher v. Peck but we also see how clearly his idea was expressedonce we find the key to the whole problem of reconstructing his viewpoint. In Ogden v. Saunders he complained that "so little progress
has yet been made in fixing the precise meaning of the words 'obligation of a contract,', that I should turn in despair from the inquiry,
were I not convinced, that the difficulties the question presents are
mostly factitious, and the result of refinement and technicality; or
of attempts at definition made in terms defective both in precision
and comprehensiveness." 150 Johnson was not preoccupied here with
the abstract relationship of one clause to another but rather stressed
the need to dwell upon the meaning of the very words at issue. Once
this meaning was ascertained it would carry with it some common
understanding of the relationship of contracts and obligations and common incidents which are the subject of their execution by the parties.
By comparison, the present method of dealing with these clauses is
circuitous and indirect'. It is the direct reverse of what Johnson attempted, but one cannot help feeling that his psychological candor is
unassailable.

B. Basic Agreement of Ma_rshall and Johnson
Yet, here again Marshall and Johnson are basically on common
ground. Whereas Marshall in Fletcher v. Peck speaks of the limitations which the nature of society puts on legislative action, Johnson
149

Id. at 892.
uo 12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 213 at 281 (1827).
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speaks of the underlying fundamental laws of society which operate
to define of what a contract or obligation consists.

C. Johnson and the Idea of a Social Compact
At this point it would be pertinent to return to Johnson's conception of a social compact. It was not, we think, the rigid notion of an
infallible writing or agreement but rather the underlying understanding of men who would govern themselves in an organized community.
These emotional ties he chose to call fundamental laws just as men
today call fundamental laws what they unconsciously feel and yet do
not fully understand. The flood of criticism of the social compact theory
emanating froµi political scientists, sociologists and even a~thropologists
stems, as Johnson would put it today, from too literal a notion of the
word "compact." When the theory is spoken of as a myth, describing
an organization of a kind of solar system with the King as the Sun,
controlling and harmonizing the parts 151 there is resort to an oversimplification which is suspect. Some modern psychiatrists have come
to recognize that there is, indeed, a social compact or compacts which
hold society together ·although it is not a legalistic or even a formal
compact. We prefer here to speak of an emotional rapport or empathy
which depends on reciprocal identifications and mutual quid pro quos of
an emotional nature. One may thus speak of a psychodynamic compact
between an infant and its mother, which later extends to take in other
members of the family group and society in gener,al. The mother
gives it food and love and security, and the child in return responds
with acceptable behavior commensurate with the amount of love it
receives. Accordingly, abandonec;l infants who su:ffer from emotional
hunger develop substitutes of their own; they "develop the habit of
making rhythmic noises or humming; still older children, who are
learning to talk, repeat words persistently and make rhymes. Invariably
the child who is deprived of inclividual mothering shows disordered
behavior, with a compensatory retardation in general alertness." m
151

GEORGE BoAS, OuR NEw WAYS OF THINKING 166 (1930).
MARGARET A. RIBBLE, THE RIGHTS OF INFANTS 82 (1943).
Rousseau, who wrote CoNTRAT SocIAL, also criticized the French mothers
for refusing to nurse their children.
While in our western civilization one leaves property to an heir, amongst the
Todas of India it is the duty of the sons to pay off the debts of their father and,
if there are no children, it is the duty of the brothers to do so. W. H. R. RIVERS,
THE ToDAS 566 (1906). Here we have a conception of "obligation" in which such
benefit as is derived from the fulfillment is mainly of a psychological nature with all
152
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So we see that for the individual the origins of precedent formation
may come from a "breach" of the first emotional "compact"-"fundaof its incidents. In SIR HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (1894) the author considered
at some length the psychological aspects of inheritance in India.
Ernest Crawley, discussing the importance of personal contact as by joining
hands, eating together, etc. amongst primitive men, which he refers to as "a bond
of such transcendant strength and inviolability ••. that we may look in vain through
history for a tie of equal power," goes on to say that "the primitive bond is the most
binding categorical imperative invented by man, and in its origins and results alike,
seems on a par with laws of nature, it is a kind of physical 'identity in difference.'
The theory of Maine, that status precedes contract, and that contract is unknown in
primitive culture needs revision. His evidence applies to barbarism, not to
savagery...• " I CRAWLEY, THE MYSTIC RosE, 306 et seq. and 290 (1927). This
eminent anthropologist is on sound ground in questioning Maine's categories as they
appear on their face; but it is more than likely that the profound and careful Maine,
at least unconsciously, thought of status as an emotional bond, which would bring the
two theories closer together.
Sir Frederick Pollock once wrote that it was possible to regard a breach of contract "as a wrong in the strictest sense, a trespass or deceit.'' PoLLOCK, A FIRST BooK
OF JURISPRUDENCE 88 (1896). This would, of course, illustrate Johnson's point that
the agreement and the duty are closely related. See also MAITLAND AND MONTAGUE,
A SKETCH OF ENGLISH LEGAL H1sTORY 15 (1915), and note by Pollock. It also
provides the tie between primitive and modern law.
In H. I. HoGBIN, LAw AND ORDER IN PoLYNESIA, A STUDY OF PRIMITIVE LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS ( I 934), the author criticizes the false assumption that there is an absence of law in primitive society. Id. 6. He stresses the fact that modern anthropology
is discarding superficial characterizations and finds in fact an intriqtte system of
mutual individual rights and obligations." He adds that, "The failure to perceive
the existence, ii;i primitive communities, of any law other than measures of repression
against violence has been due mainly to a too narrow conception of law, as consisting
in a body of rules expressly laid down and enforced by institutions existing fox: the
purpose.'' Id. 77. After agreeing with Vinogradoff that in such societies there is in
fact little "conscious effort toward the so1ution of soci_al problems" he proceeds to
criticize Jhering (Von Jhering) for insisting that amongst them struggle was an
essential quality of law. What is especially pertinent at this point is his concluson
that, "The system of clearly recognized obligations that has been discovered wherever
a primitive tribe has been carefully investigated, does not trace its origin to a series
of express commands issued by some superior authority, nor is it the outcome of a
purposive effort." Id. 78. (Italics the writer's.) Hogbin does not stress the emotional
basis of these obligations but adheres to Malinowski's theory of a "complex interaction
of stimuli which combine to make it worth the individual's while to carry out even
distasteful obligations. Id. 83. The structure of binding obligations is considered as
"a specific mechanism inherent in the structure of the society.'' Id. 83.
While there are differences, of course, between primitive and civilized society,
the primitive patterns are still in large measure preserved in civilized society but not
always recognizable. Civilized man in his education from infancy to adulthood passes
through the primitive stage and never completely rejects the earlier processes. Hence,
in any.theory of "a state of nature" or of underlying "fundamental law" we find that
less tangible element of "interaction.'' In constitutional law the phenomenon appears
in the frequently repeated statement to the effect that there are principles "of greater
value to mankind than the guarantee of the Constitution.••• " The last quotation is

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 44

mental law" if one prefers to call it that. Such individuals, who later
may come into power in society, spend the rest of their lives attemptfrom the opfaion of Mr. Justice Reed in Jones v. Opelika, quoted in Levin, "Mr.
Justice William Johnson and the Unenviable Dilemma," 42 MICH. L. REV. 803 at
806, note II (1944).
It is revealing to find that in his discussion of the jurisdiction of the federal
courts in criminal cases, in one of the propositions which he asserts, Rawle speaks of
"a law of -tacit convention, founded on a few plain principles," which require "no
positive law to have it understood, that one shall not, without cause deprive another
of his. property, or do injury to his person." He relies on "the human heart; the universal sense and practice of mankind"; and speaks of the law of nature as being
implanted in us by nature itself-"it is felt, not learned. ••• " RAwLE, A Vrnw OF
THE CoNSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 251-252 (1825). (Italics
the writer's.)
-Patrick Henry argued that the government was "a conditional compact, composed of mutual and dependent covenants, the King promising protection, the people
promising obedience and support." Quoted by HAINES, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME
CouRT IN AMERICAN GovERNMENT AND POLITICS 1789-1835, 59 (1944). The
political idea of the compact or contract theory of government is discussed by Haines,
id. 105 et seq. There is a brief mention of the part which the idea of "a state of
nature" played in the conscious thinking of leaders of that day. Madison, he points
out, thought of a compact between individuals and the whole body of people collectively; and that Luther Martin at one time contended that when the people were
thrown together in a state of nature there was involved a combination of individuals
with one another. Id. 108. Chief Justice Jay, however, spoke of "a compact deliberately
formeq, maturely considered, and solemnly adopted and ratified" by the people of
the United States as sovereigns: each citizen was a member of this compact. Id. 126.
See also Id. 165-169, 170, 443. Politicians of the period contradicted themselves in
asserting at one time the primordial compact between individuals and, at another,
insisting that the government was a compact between the states. No logical consisency
is to be looked for. All variations of the social compact theory are but different aspects
of underlying psychodynamic fact.
Marshall rejected the idea that all contracts sprung from human legislation and,
recognizing a sub-stratum, stressed "intrinsic obligation" as the following passage from
Ogden v. Saunders shows: "It is an argument of no inconsiderable weight against it,
that we find no trace of such enactment. So far back as human research carries us,
we find the judicial power as a part of the executive, administering justice by the
application of remedies to violated rights, or broken contracts. We find that power
applying these remedies, on the idea of a pre-existing obligation on every man to
do what he has promised on consideration to do; that the breach of his obligation
is an injury for which the injured party has a just claim to compensation, and that
society ought to afford him a remedy for that injury. We find allusions to the mode
of acquiring property, but we find no allusions, from the earliest time, to any supposed act of the governing power giving obligation to contracts. On the contrary, the
proceedings respecting them of which we know anything, evince the idea of pre-existing
intrinsic obligation which human law enforces. If, on tracing the right to contract,
and the obligations created by contract, to their source, we find them to exist anterior
to, and independent of society, we may reasonablr, conclude, that those original and
pre-existing principles are, like many other natural rights, brought with man into
society; and although they may be -controlled, are not given by human legislation."
12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 213 at 344 (1827).
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ing to gain from the whole of society what they have hungered for
from their infancy, and employ the precedents of their infancy-which
are but emotional distortions-to achieve tliis delayed satisfaction.

IX
CooRDINATION OF J OHNsoN's THEORY OF STATE FUNCTION WITH His
THEORY OF INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION

A. Checks and Balances in Relation to Individual Aggressions
Johnson must have felt that the constitutional mechanisms for
dealing with the potential tyranny of government were insufficient.
We have seen elsewhere that his praise of the Constitution was in
superlatives. Indeed, the checks and balances provided in the Constitution were designed as restraints upon government only; no restrictions were placed upon the positive action of the government for the
-protection of its citizens. Such restraints upon the powers of government as existed were, indeed, for the very purpose of protecting its
citizens. Johnson repeatedly warned that the greater danger would be
found ih the tyranny of man over man. We have already seen that he
considered "the worst of all despotisms" that "which makes every
individual the tyrant over his neighbor's rights." 158 That must be why
he considered the provision against bills of attainder and ex post facto
legislation as "a general provision against arbitrary and tyrannical
legislation over existing rights, whether of person or property." 154 In
158

Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. (19 U.S.) 204 at 226, 228 (1821).
Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 213 at 286 (1827).
It is one thing to hope for a democracy in which men are able to deal with
their aggressions-called "passions" in Johnson's time. It is another either to deny that
they exist or to minimize their importance. This often occurs when persons try to deny
their own aggressive purpose or manner. We are, therefore, unable to subscribe to
Haines' view when he attributes the following quotation (and the few sentences following it} to Alexander Hamilton's desire to check "the imprudence or follies of the
people" because Hamilton assumed that political conflicts would center around the few:
"It i1 of great importance in a republic not only to guard the 1ociety against the oppr&11ion of it1 rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the inju1tice of the other
part. Different intere1ts neces1arily exi1t in different cla11e1 of citizens." HAINES, THE
164

ROLE OF THE SuPREME CouRT IN UNITED STATES GovERNMENT AND PouTics

1789-1835, 197 (1944). (Italics the writer's.) This analysis by Hamilton accords
with Johnson's view. Johnson was not a Federalist, although he believed in a central
authority in its consitutional sphere. It is true that Hamilton in the sentences following
suggested the old monarchical remedy of "a will in the community independent of
the majority." Nevertheless, this should not lead us to disparage the psychological
insight of his statement about the oppression of man by his neighbor, which has been
borne out by the history of mankind. The recognition of a psychodynamic fact is
often more important than a political discussion of remedies in which the traits of
human behavior are overlooked.
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this again he agreed with Marshall. Both saw the need for controlling
the "passions of men" and thereby gave recognition to the need for
concern about human emotions when aggressively exercised. This idea
is clearly expressed in Fletcher v. Peck. Their mental approaches, however, took different forms. Marshall was interested negatively in pre. venting infraction of human rights by the states. Johnson saw that it
was the positive duty of the individual states to take all affirmative
~teps required to prevent the tyranny of man over man. Hence, in
0 gden v. Saunders, he saw in the insolvency laws a means of preventing the tyranny of the creditor over the debtor, that: is, man over
maq, saymg:
" •.. For it is among the duties of society, to enforce the
rights of humanity; and both the debtor and the society have
their interest in the administration of justice, and in the general
good; interest which 'must not be swallowed up and lost sight
of, while yielding attention to the claim of the creditor. The
debtor may plead the visitations of Providence, and the society
has an interest in preserving every member of the community
from despondency-in relieving him from a hopeless state of
prostration, in which he would be useless to himself, his family
and the community. When that state of things has arrived, in
which the community has fairly and fully discharged its duties
to the creditor, and in which, pursuing the debtor any longer
would destroy the one, without benefiting the other, must always
be a question to be determined by the common guardian of the
rights of both; and in this originates the power exercised by governments in favor of insolvents. It grows out of the administration
of justice, and is a necessary appendage to it." m
I

He saw, then, that men could be regimented by other men and that
the prevention of such despotism under the guise of freedom of contract was a prime concern of government. Today we have begun to.
learn· that liberty when viewed from one vantage poin~ presents only
one side of an ambivalence. The constant interplay of the ideas of free
competition and the freedom to monopolize, so prevalent today, bear
out Johnson's concern.
Its extremes may mean, psychologically, a desire to subordinate
completely, by rendering them innocuous, all others in certain spheres
of activity who may have a claim to liberty. The expressed motives
of benevolence in such case are no different from those which have
.u 5 Id. at 283. (Italics the writer's.)
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always been heard in situations of control, be they political, executive
or otherwise. Nor does this mean that this tendency is peculiar to any
group or class of individuals in society. Those who have won a portion
of liberty soon feel the psychological drive toward dominance under
the mask of a benign purpose. Thus, the pendulum of aggression
swings from one to the other without that cooperation which a wholesome psychological condition would suggest. Harold D. Lasswell,
who has studied many of those who seek power as psychological cases,
perceives that, "The road to power in our civilization is by no means
an exclusively governmental highway, for technical implements have
scattered authority...." He finds that directors of large corporations
"have to make decisions which are far more important for the daily
happiness of mankind than most of the decisions of governments." m
Nor, is the possibility of tyranny of man over man confined to the governmental or industrial politician.' Every right which we hold dear,
such as freedom of the press and freedom of religion, we have seen
made the instrument of persecution in our very day. The existence of
racial and anti-feminine discrimin_ation in labor unions indicates that
power once gained may easily renew injustice previously fought
against.
To Johnson "the sole end and aim of all our institutions is the
safety and happiness of the citizens." m Hence, _the individual states
must be permitted to assume the responsibility locally for bringing
this ·about and must not be interfered with, even by the federal government, in the management of their "internal concerns" 158 except
when individual right is arbitrarily and tyrannically dealt with. This
is ·the sum of his theories of states rights. "States rights, or United
States' rights are nothing, except as they contribute to the safety and
,happiness of the people. For them, both governments are formed; and
made mutually to check and control each other, that they may work
solely to the one end, the happiness of the individual." m To his mind
156

LASSWELL, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND POLITICS 47 (1934).
Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. (19 U.S.) 204 at 226 {1821).
iGs Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) at 281 {1827). This must have
been his view as early as 1801 before he became a Justice of the United States Supreme
Court. It was expressed by him as a state judge in South Carolina in State v. Pitman,
l Brevard (3 S.C.) 33 at 34 (1801); cited by Levin, "Mr. Justice William Johnson,
Creative Dissenter," 43 M1cH. L. REv. 497 at 512, note 41 (1944).
iG 9 See Levin, "Mr. Justice William Johnson and the Unenviable Dilemma,"
42 M1cH. L. REv. 803 at 818 (1944), quoting from 2 WILLIAM JoHNSON, APP. F,
pp. 475,. 476.
iG
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the true views of the Constitution were "equally uninfluenced by the
Pretensions of the States or the United States." 160
What Johnson saw more clearly than most of his contemporaries,
and even those who came after him, was that personal despotic government somehow, whether by tryanny or otherwise, held in check man's
aggressions against his neighbors. To him it was a solecism, therefore,
to suppose that "the permanent laws of any government, particularly
those which relate to the administration of justice between individuals,
can be radically unequal or even unwise. It is scarcely ever so in
despotic governments; much less iri those in which the good of the
whole is the predominating principle." 161 It must have puzzled him
160
See Levin, "Mr. Justice William Johnson, Creative Dissenter," 43 MICH. L.
REV. 497 at 506, note 27 (1944) quoting from Johnson's letter fo Jefferson under
date of April 11, l 823. Johnson made it clear that his states' rights doctrine was mainly
functional. It was surely more emotional than political.
.
Daniel Webster correctly argued in his second reply to Hayne that the Constitution was the act of the people even though ratified by the states, and rejected
Hayne's contention derived from the idea that the states were sovereign under the
Articles of Confederation. Although Haines quotes Webster's sentence, "It is sir, the
people's Constitution, the people's govern~ent, made for the people, made by the
people, and ,answerable to the people" (which anticipated Lincoln's Gettysburg address
by some decades), one gathers from the following, as from other parts of the book, ·
the obvious feeling that Haines maintains that any loyalty to the unifying federal
government is to be stigmatized as "subjective" whereas a loyalty to discordant
"sovereignties" which could easily make the people of America the prey of every local
and foreign aggression is not subjective. We quote: ''Webster's answer to this argument was that even though the states were sovereign in 1787 and though the Constitution was ratified by the people acting through conventions called by such sovereign
states, yet this act of adoption was really not the act of the several states, but of the
whole people united into a political unity by a subjectioe feeling of nationality which
is the ultimate foundation of every sovereign state. That is, the national state existed
subjectively in the minds of the people and was made objective by the creation of the
national government, and existing state organs and political machinery were used merely
for convenience to carry out that purpose. This was, in effect, the 'organic or nationalist' philosophy as described in a previous chapter." HAINES, THE RoLE OF THE
SuPREME CouR'i' JN AMERICAN GovERNMENT AND PoL1ncs 1789-1835, 559 et seq.
( l 944). Justice Johnson, though he is classed as an advocate of state sovereignty, did
not adhere to any such rigid notion but attempted, rather, an approach which was
more in accord with the psychological facts confronting the people in relation to
obvious governmental problems.· The view recently expressed by Mr. Justice Rutledge
may be said to return to the more functional view of Johnson, when he said: "Vague
ideas of dual federalism, of ultra vires p,octrine imported from private agency, and of
want of finality in official action, do not nullify what four years of civil strife secured
and eighty years have verified. For it was abuse of basic civil and political rights, by
states and their officials, that the Amendment and the enforcing legislation were
adopted to uproot." Screws v. United States, (U.S. 1944) 89 L. Ed. 1029 at 1944.
Daniel Webster, in his analysis of the relationship between subjective and objective
factors, showed remarkable and unusual capacity for evaluating what took place.
161
Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 213 at 279 (1827).
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that people so readily yielded to the tryanny of the despot who could
control every phase of life, and yet remonstrated at those necessary
things which a government of the people had to do-those common
incidents of life which must be faced. Almost a century was to pass
before the dynamics of such things were even partly to be understood.
Johnson consoled himself, and rightfully, with the thought that the
American democracy was ahead of schedule in the development of
the human race. "The constitution," he reflected, "was framed for
society, and an advanced state of society, in which I will undertake
to say, that all the contracts of men receive a relative, and not a positive interpretation: for the rights of all must be held and enjoyed in
subserviency to the good of the whole. The state construes them, the
state applies them, the state controls them, and the state decides how
far the social exercise of the rights they give us over each other can be
justly asserted. I say, the social exercise of these rights, because in a
state of nature, they are asserted over a fellow-creature, but in a state
of society, over a fellow-citizen. Yet, it is worthy of observation, how
closely the analogy is preserved between the assertion of these rights
in a state of nature and a state of society, in their application to the
class of contracts under consideration." 162 Here Johnson is not advocating any theory of the state which would glorify the power to subordinate the citizen. Such a thought would, have been revolting to him
despite his recognition of the existence of the despotism of power. But,
rather, he is negativing a conception of "contract" which would paralyze society and he is dispelling the notion that the "contract," which
at every stage arises out of the common incidents of social contacts,
was intended by the Constitution to supervene the state or to swallow
up its capacity to function.

B. Johnson's Idea of the Law of Nature
Hale says that "like the other judges at that time, Johnson accepted the prevailing belief that men once lived in 'a state of nature,'
without government but subject to 'universal' or 'natural' law, which
in some mysterious way was something more than moral obligation.... " 168 The ingredient of mystery was so foreign to Johnson's
162

Id. at 282. A portion of this quotation has already appeared in Levin, "Mr.
Justice William Johnson and the Common Incidents of Life: I," 44 MrcH. L. REv.
59 at l 12 (1945).
168
Robert L. Hale, "The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause: Ill," 57
HARV. L. REv. 328 at 352 et seq. (1944).
Morgan also emphasizes Johnson's adherence ti;> the conventional natural law
doctrine. See Morgan, "Mr. Justice William Johnson and the Constitution," 57 HARV.
L. REV. 328 at 352 et seq. (1944).
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thinking, as we shall see, that we must demur to any inclusion of
Johnson in the conventional class of "natural law" thinkers referred
to. Fletcher v. Peck was Johnson's repudiation of tli·e common conception of natural law, for he argued that the revocation of the grant
by the State of Georgia would run counter to the "reason and nature
of things: a principle which will impose laws eve.n on the Deity." 164
The dbctrine of natural law in Johnson's day was so connected with the
conventional mysterious omnipresence of legality that "the reason
and nature of things,". while suggesting some vague idea of the reality
of the human mind and its effort to grasp the nature of things, could
hardly indicate anything more than the faintest shadow of natural
law doctrine. Johnson was clearly referring to primitive relationships,
not as a finality; but as a subject of study. So, likewise, in the last·
passage from Ogden v. Saunders the word "nature" is employed in
an anthropological sense. We do not deceive ourselves into believing
that a science of anthropology existed then in the sense we know it
today. But there was a decided trend toward the study of primitives.
Rousseau's writings and the writings of others, and the presence of
the, primitive Indian tribes in America so close to civilized man, had
stirred a great interest in the origin of institutions. Rousseau's return
to "nature" had in it, however,'the elements of an escape and a repudiation of civilization. Johnson understood and accepted the idea, which
we are just beginning to learn all over again, that the progress of the
parties in a civilized society "from the initiation to the consummation
of their rights, is exactly parallel" to that in primitive society.165 This
164
6 Cranch (10 U.S.) 87 at 143. John P. Cotton, Jr., was somewhat nearer to
an interpretation of Johnson's view, as expressed in this case, when he said that,
"Such a view, that some such basic principles of society exist which are within the province of 'the courts to expound and apply, has often found expression in later opinions ·
that hark back to these phrases •••." I CoTToN, CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS OF JoHN
MARSHALL 2 3 3 ( 190 5). Cotton here stresses the existence of principles rather than
any mysterious origin of them. See also Levin, "Mr. Justice William Johnson, Creative
Dissenter," 43 MICH. L. REv. 497 at 526, note 71 (1944).
165 12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 213 at 282 et seq. (1827). The.passage from Ogden
v. Saunders from which this quotation is taken reads:
"Two men, A and B, having no previqus connection with each other (we may
suppose tlrem even of hostile nations), are thrown upon a desert island. The first,
having had the good fortune to procure food, bestows a part of it upon the other, and
he contracts to return an equivalent in kind. It is obvious here, that B subjects himself to something more than the moral obligation of his contract, and that the law
of nature, and the sense of mankind, would justify A in resorting to any means in his
power to compel a compliance of this contract. But if it should appear, that B, by sickness, by accident or circumstances beyond human control, however superinduced, could
not possibly comply with his contract, the decision would be otherwise, and the
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was to become the center of much disputation in the decades to follow,
when people became ·interested in the name of both religion and
science in proving that mankind had descended down the scale of
progress. By unconscious inversion, therefore, these same persons
attributed to the primitive state the same goodness that Rousseau had
found in the state of "nature." In seeing that civilized institutions are
in large m.easure derived from more pri~itive ones, Johnson was
facing the psychodynamic reality of the conversion of emotional energy
which later investigations confirmed in the case of "savages," infants
and children.

C. The Meaning of Civilization: Greater Cooperation
Among Individuals
The Constitution had provided the necessary checks on "sovereign"
tyranny by vesting the "sovereignty" in the people who would somehow or other protect their interests. That problem had been solved in
its principal outlines. While others were showing considerable anxiety
about the i1wasion of contract or property rights by government, Johnson saw real danger in a concept of liberty which meant the liberty of
one to enslave or tyrannize over another. The provisions in the Constitution on this subject were only negative. The least that the judiciary
could do would be to permit th~ individual states to legislate for the
common good, which meant that the anarchical concept of primitive
liberty had to be modified for the purposes of cooperative living; and
this meant considerable judicial self-restraint.
Statements, which some might choose to select as indications of
exercise of compulsory power over B would be followed with the indignation of mankind. He has carded the power conferred on him over the will or actions of another
beyond their legitimate extent, and done injustice in his turn. 'Summum jus est summa
injuria.>
"The progress of parties, from the initiation to the consummation of their
rights, is exactly parallel to this, in a state of society. With this difference, that in
the concoction of their contracts, they are controlled by the laws of the society of
which they are members; and for the construction and enforcement of their contracts,
they rest upon the functionaries of its government. They can enter into no contract
which the laws of that community forbid, and the validity and effect of their contracts
is, what the existing laws give to them. The remedy is no longer retained in their
own hands, but surrendered to the community, to a power competent to do justice,
and bound to discharge towards them the acknowledged duties of government to
society, according to received principles of equal justice. The public duty, in this
respect, is the substitute for that right which they possessed in a state of nature, to
enforce a fulfillment of contracts; and if, even in a state of nature, limits were prescribed, by the reason and nature of things, to the exercise of individual power in
enacting the fulfillment of contracts, much more will they be in a state of society."
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a "sociological" concept of jurisprudence, appear in a number of
places in Johnson's writings. "We have an interest," he declared, after
having been on the bencli for almost a quarter of a century, "in the
happiness, and services, and families of this community, which shall
not be superseded by individual views." 166 Society, therefore, is the
"common guardian" of the rights of all. The "rights of humanity"
and the "general good" were not to be "swallowed up" unilaterally
by_ one of the parties to a contract.167 There was to be cooperation for
the common good. 168 He did what a modern anthropologist would do
to emphasize the contrast. He compared the then current practice with
what prevailed in primitive life. "There was a time when a different
idea prevailed, and then it was supposed, that the rights of the creditor
required the sale of the debtor and his family. A similar notion now
prevails on the coast of Africa, and is often exercised there by brute
force. It is worthy only of the country in which it now exists, and of
that state of society in which it once originated and prevailed." 169
The silfety-valve against excesses was the citizen himself, so long
as the citizen looked to his liberties. "It is very true, that inconveniences
may occasionally grow out of irregularities in the adminstration of
justice by the states. But the citizen of the same state is referred to
his influence over his own institution for his security, and the citizens
of the other states have the institutions and powers of the general
government to refer to. And this is all the security the constitution
ever intended to ~old out against the undue exercise of the power of
the states over their own contracts, and their own jurisprudence." 110
The highest embodiment of state function, then, was the protection of the individual from the unwarranted aggressions of his fellow
men under the guise of pure hostility or cloaked in the garb of colorable
legal procedure:
. "No one questions the duty of the government to protect
and enforce the just rights of every individual over all within its
control. What we contend for, is no more than this, that it is
equally the duty and ,right of governments to impose limits to
the avarice and tyranny of individuals, so as not to suffer oppression to be exercised under the semblance, of right and fustice.
It is true, that, in the exercise of this power, governments themId. at 289.
Id. at 283.
168
Id. at 283.
169
Id. at 284.
170
Id. at 285. See also Levin, "Mr. Justice William Johnson and The Unenviable Dilemma," 42 M1cH. L. REv. 803 at 807 (1944).
166
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selves may sometimes be the authors of oppression and injustice;
but whenever the constitution could impose limits to such power,
it has done so; and if it has not been able to impose effectual and
universal restraints, it arises only from the extreme difficulty of
regulating the movements of sovereign power; and the absolute
necessity, after every effort that can be made to govern effectually,
that will still exist, to leave some space for the exercise of discretion, and the influence of justice and wisdom." 171

In stressing inter-personal relationships Johnson saw ahead of his
time and knew that he was in the vanguard of human progress. Even
today the resistance to any solutions of the problems raised by the
impacts of relationships of persons with each other is very great. How
much more so was it in his day when many men thought that democracy meant freedom to annihilate one's neighbor. The studies of the
emotional and psychodynamic bases of individual and social conduct
are but beginning to have any appreciable effect though they have a
good start. Johnson, without such a science, had the insight to put
his finger at an early stage on the most serious problem with which
all government is confronted: the emergence of human aggression
in a civilized garb was the real danger that any government must guard
against! Rationalization as an instrument of justification of private
despotisms was but an instrument in the course of unrestrained conduct.
D. Comparison of Federal and State Function: Incident
Distinguished from Essence
Paradoxical though it may appear, Johnson's emphasis on the
function of the individual states as protectors against the tyranny of
citizen over citizen helps explain also his strong Federalist views.
The federal government was the substitute for the personal tyranny
of a despotic British monarch and Parliament, and embodied in its
very symbolism, purpose and substazice the vital elements which
brought about harmony. The psychological ambivalence consists here
of the recognition of the federal government as the unifying agency,
uniting what Thomas Jefferson once called the "family" of individual
states. Its primary dynamic significance was not then in its concern
with the positive duties of the state toward the citizen, but with those
basic concerns which aimed at cooperation between units -of government. In no other way may we understand his concept of the exclusive
power of Congress over commerce so well stated by him in a few words
171

12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 213 at 292 (1'827).
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in Gibbons v. 0 gden. "When speaking of the power of congress over
navigation, I do not regard it as a power incidental to that of regulating
commerce; I consider it as the thing itself; ins'eparable from it~ vital
motion is from vital existence." 172 Just as the protection of the individual and the concern about his welfare was an inherent state function,
so anything that was essential to communication between the states was
inherently a subject of federal function. The very purpose of the Constitution was to combine the states into a harmonized cooperating and
functioning whole. Navigation or any .other instruments of communication could not, therefore, be incidents of commerce. The thought appears again in the same opinion: "But it is almost laboring to prove
a self-evident proposition, s~nce the sense of mankind, the practice of
the world, the contemporaneous .assumption, and continued exercise
-of the power, and universal acquiescence, have so clearly established
the right of congress over navigation, and the transportation of both
men and their goods, as not only incidental to, but actually of the
essence of, the power to regulate commerce. As to the transportation
of passengers, and passengers in a steam-boat, I consider it as having
been solemnly recognized by the State of New York, as a subject both
of commercial regulations and of revenue." 173
172

9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) I at 229 (1824).
"But fourteen years of practical - administration had required a number of
deviations from the principles of 1801. Most of these deviations, such as the purchase of Louisiana, the embargo, anq the ~izure of West Florida, tended in the
direction of nationalism.'' HAINES, THE RoLE OF THE SUPREME CouRT IN AMERICAN
GovERNMENT AND POLITICS 1789-1835, 308 (1944).
Commenting on Justice Johnson's opinion in the Embargo case, Gilchrist v.
Collector, IO Fed. Cas. 355 (1808), Haines says: "The controversy over this decision
demonstrated that, though Justice Johnson -at the time of his appointment to the
Supreme Court was a friend of Jefferson and was considered to be in accord with his
political views, he had by this time gone a long way, so far as constitutional "interpretation was concerned,toward the acceptance of the main tenets of Federalism. And
for the remaining years of a long judicial career he supported the views of Marshall
and Story, though at times objecttng to the extreme nationalist notions of his
associates." HAINES, THE RoLE OF THE SUPREME CouRT IN AMERICAN GoVERNMENT AND POLITICS 1789-1835, 293 (1944). The writer of this article believes that
the dichotomy of Federalism (nationalism) and States Rights which Haines and other
historians dwell upon at great length is no longer adequate to explain the course either
of American history or any history. A psychodynamic evaluation is needed to get beneath the surface of rationalizations. There is often an alternation of these attitudes
(and, of course, a fusion) due to the psychological process of inversion and other
complex factors. See GEORGE W. HENRY, EssENTIALS OF PSYCHIATRY 30 (1928). As
pointed out in an earlier article in this REVIEW, ambivalence is a common factor in
all psychological processes, be they political or otherwise. It is important to point
out inconsistencies but it must always be understood that such a simple analysis explains little. It is much more important to trace their origins.
173 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 1 at 230-231 (1824).
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So, to him, the provision in the Constitution for the setting up of
federal courts in every state thr<)Ughout the nation had for its object,
as in the case of the commerce clause, "an harmonious distribution of
justice throughout the Union.... "The purpose was to "obviate that
conftictus legum, which has employed the pens of Huberus and various
others, and which anyone who studies the subject will plainly perceive"
--and he then concludes the sentence with an observation which could
:fit into any modern work on psychology-that "it is infinitely more
easy to prevent than to adjust." 174
When Johnson was thinking of the explicitly expressed purposes
which motivated the abandonment of the Articles of Confederation
and led to the establishment of the Constitution he did not consider
these as incidents. These purposes were the very essence of the Constitution and, hence, could not be considered apart. Nevertheless, even
in determining whether navigation and the transportation of men and
goods "is not only incidental to, but actually of the essence of, the
power to regulate commerce," he does not depart from his usual
method of interpretation. He examines the practice of the world, contemporaneous assumption, continued exercise of power and universal
acquiescence, even though he feels it is "laboring to prove a selfevident proposition."
Although he thought of both the federal and state governments
in terms of function, as a human being he displayed the usual tendency
to personaiize; thus, he invested the state governments with more of
the old dynamism of personal sovereignty. While all bodies politic
were despotisms in one sense, he most often applied this description
to the state legislatures. Writing to John Taylor, his old classmate,
he does not conceal his feelings and shows that his conception of a
"sovereign" state emotionally still had a 1arge element of sovereign
person in it. "Heaven save us," he implores, "from encountering the
irritable feelings of sovereigns." m It is no surprise, therefore, that
he considered the task of adjudicating states' rights a delicate one and
not too willingly undertaken. The desire of Johnson, the man, to live,
. to act, to be independ~nt, to exercise the "sovereignty" of individual
liberty was largely attached to the symbol of the individual state; and
he looked, therefore, to the individual state to preserve it. His humanitarian idea of a positive state function to help achieve this end cannot
be dissociated from his hermeneutics .or any part· of his _view of the
174

12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 213 at 359 (1827).
Letter dated Sept. 22, 1830 quoted by Morgan, "Mr. Justice William Johnson and the Constitution," 57 HARv. L. REv. 328 at 359 (1944).
175
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judicial function. Neither can his striving for centralized direction
toward harmony of the union-what Je:fferson called the cement of
the union-be separated from it.

X
LAw AS A MEANS OF CoMMUNICATION

A. Involvement with Language and Consequent "Mysteries"
So many have attempted definitions of law and its various aspects
that we would refrain from attempting to crystalize so much into a
phrase or sentence. However, what seems to have been overlooked
by students of jurisprudence is that law is primarily a means of communication 176 between a single or aggregate communicant and others
176
It is one of the anomalies of the science of jurisprudence that it has been
slowest to become integrated with the other sciences. No one would doubt that law, as
a social study, was but a portion of the whole of human aspiration and tradition we
call "culture"; nevertheless, the same persons would seek to isolate law as a phenome.non
of different origin. Yet anthropologists have recognized culture as a means of communication. Robert ~- Marret has illustrated this characterization by pointing out
that "the ape that hurls a casual missile communicates a thowing impulse to his
imitative companions." He says further: "Culture is communicable intelligence.
Intelligence being mind viewed in its directive and purposive capacity, the meanings
that we communicate essentially relate to purposes that we wish to share. Communication is a two-sided process, taking in being just as important as giving out; so much
so, indeed, that the tragedy of history may be said to consist in the fact that the nations ,have so often failed to· interpret what their men of genius sought to express.
For, strictly speaking, each man's experience is locked up in his own bosom. If the
other man's mind is to be made to respond, a medium of communication, always of a
physical kind, must be used; such as a gesture, a sound, or a piece of paper with marks
on it. Thereupon the other party to the communication can share in the purpose
suggested just in so far as he can translate the outward sign into terms of his own
consciousness." 2 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITrANicA, 14th ed., 41 at 44 (1932).
(Italics the writer's.)
This clear exposition of the two-sided nature of culture, so obvious as to seem
too simple, must needs negative any conception of law as barring the consideration of
the "inner:man" who is both _on the "giving-out" and the "taking-in" sides of the
communicating process. This is the viewpoint of modern studies of human behavior
and renders the one-sided conception not only tragic bttt regressive.
"Aside from the very general usage of the word extression in such a way as to
obscure the sequence of events, the term also may, and often does, include the notion
of communication. Thus the 'expression of emotions' frequently means, not only visible
attitudes and actions, but also the intention of the attitudes or actions to influence or
make an impression on some other person. The 'expression' in this sense becomes equivalent to a method of conveying information, and is in fact a kind of language, whether
spoken words are used or not. In some form it is essential to every social situation and
must occur whenever two or more individuals are met together." Nina Bull, "Towards
a Clarification of the Concept of Emotion," 7 PsYCHOMATIC MEDICINE 210 at 2II
( I 945). This brief essay presents a new approach to the understanding of the expres-
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in society, wherein the reciprocity
of relationship is assumed to bring
about a result of cooperation in the members of the group; its other
side is perception and self-control by the individual who seeks to
understand the communication. As time goes on, what was once legal
falls away with the growth of understanding and the progress of feelings and empathies. In this respect law resembles language which is the
most common means of communication. But law is also secondarily
involved with language because it employs language to embody its
own communications. This is bound to lead to confusion, in the substitution of the means for the end and the law and words for the
purpose. Johnson must have realized this, for nowhere else in our
jurisprudence do we find such psychodynamic consistency as in his
dwelling upon the use of language.
Johnson declared that "no one is so visionary as to dispute the
assertion, that the sole end and aim of all our institutions is the safety
and happiness of the citizen. But the relation between the action and
the end, is not always so direct and palpable as to strike the eye of
every observer." 111 This confusion or obscurity was due in large
measure to magical and superstitious causes. Therefore, to achieve what
he once phrased as "the one great effort at ameliorating mankind" 178
sion of emotion by its serial division into two phases of motor attitude and action. We
here call attention to the two-phased nature of expression which Robert R. Marret has
applied to the science of anthropology.
John Adams' choice of language in describing the purpose of government was,
therefore, not accidental when he said: " .•. that the form of government which
communicates ease, comfort, security, or, in one word happiness, to the greatest number of persons, and in the greatest degree, is the best." (Italics the writer's.) Quoted
by Julian P. Boyd from Ray Forrest Harvey in BoYD, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE {. (1945). We have already seen that Johnson emphasized communication; and have quoted Johnson's statement that there must always "be that communication of thought and experiment without which nothing human can advance in
improvement." Supra, p. 243.
In Gibbons v. Ogden, Johnson remarked that "One-half the doubts in life arise
from the defects of language." 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) I at 232 (1824); quoted by Levin
in "Language, Symbol, Cycles and The Constitution," 71 U.S. L. REv. 258 at 260
(1937). In Ogden v. Saunders, Johnson spoke of "a measure a thousand times wiser
than that impulse to speculation and ruin, which hitherto has been communicated to
individuals by our public policy." Quoted at p. 246, supra.
George W. Henry observes that among vertebrates "we observe a great need of
means of communication with the environment." HENRY, EssENTIALS OF PsYCHIATRY
3 ( I 928). He also lists as a general characteristic of the higher vertebrates ( to which
man b~longs) "the ability to learn to communicate with their own species, to modify
instincts, and to prepare themselves while still under parental care for the struggles
of adult life." Id. 7.
177
Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. (19 U.S.) 204 at 226 (1821).
178
Or-ation delivered at St. Phillips Church, Charleston, at p. 6.
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it was necessary to break away from some of the "mysteries which had
kept mankind in, ignorance. And with a boldness which would even
startle most minds today, he declared all the notions of society and
jurisprudence to be more or less artificial and, fighting fire with fire,
asserted in effect that eve~ the charge of artificialty was of little concern, ~o long
. as the result was to dispel. the magical effect of literality:

"If it be objected to the views which I have taken on this
subject, that they imply a departure from the direct and literal
meaning of terms, in order to substitute an artificial or complicated
exposition; my reply is, that the error is on the other side; qui
hoeret in liter.a, hoeret in cortice. All the notions of society, particularly in their jurisprudence, are more or less artificial; our
constitution nowhere speaks the language of men in a state of
nature; let anyone attempt a literal exposition of the phrase
which immediately precedes the one under consideration, I mean
ex post facto, and he will soon acknowledge a failure. Or let
him reflect on the mysteries that hang ar01-md the little slip of
paper which lawyers know by the title of a bail-piece. The truth
is, that even compared with the principles of natural law, scarcely
any contract imposes an obligation conformable to the literal
meaning of terms. He who enters into a contract to follow the
plough for the year, is not held to its literal performance, since
many casualties may intervene, which would release him from the
obligation, without actual performance. There is a very striking
illustration of this principle to be found in many instances in the
books; I mean, those cases in which parties are released from their
contracts, by a declaration of war, or where laws are passed rendering that unlawful, even incidentally, which was lawful at the
time of the contract. Now, in both these instances, it is the government that puts an end to tl].e contract, and yet no one ever imagined, that it thereby violates the obligation of contracts." 179
-

However, we must repeat, as we have indicated previously, that Johnson was not a quixotic enemy of the litera,l. It was psychologically and
dynamically correct to expect that communication be made as clear
as possible, and that when ideas were unequivocally expressed, the
end of the problem of their linguistic meaning was, in most instances,
arrived at. However, this was not the end of their legal meaning with
which the linguistic meaning was so intertwined as to be inseparable.
179
Ogden'v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 213 at 290 et seq. (1827). (Ital_ics
the writer's, except in the case of the words "qui hoerat in letera hoeret in cortice"
and "ex post facto.")
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Effects, objects, purposes, identifications, applications, motives, and no
doubt other things, all arise with the passing of time. All contribute
to the legal meaning, whether it be in private or constitutional law.
While this integration of communication and meaning may not be
anywhere explicitly or categorically stated by Johnson, the thought
was conveyed, the method was always followed and the idea clearly
deducible. And, fortunately, we know even better today, as a result of
the efforts of anthropologists and psychiatrists, that when the words
themselves are the ultimate certainties, magic has begun its insidious
work and that law, as a dynamic means of communication, has ceased
to exist.
B. Fear and th-e Metaphysical
Johnson's well-rounded view of life, grounded as it was in emotional integrity, carried with it a. certain amount of impatience with
the artificialities which he recognized as almost omnipresent. His mind
was acute to distinguish between the actual and the artificial, and to
realize the functional nature of the means employed by the human
mind where nearly all others accepted and even fought for the artificial
as an end result. And what is most important, he was alert to see that
fear was an element not to be _treated lightly since "individual fears
may be alarmed by the monsters of imagination." 180 His sharp criti~
cisms of "refinement and technicality" were not directed to the instruments of communication themselves but rather to the misunderstanding
and misuse of them! The whole nation recently agreed with Johnson
when, in mourning, it repeated "again and again" the words of the late
President Franklin D. Roosevelt that "the only thing we have to fear
is fear itself." 181
180

Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. (19 U.S.) 204 at 226 (1821).
See Levin, "Mr. Justice William Johnson and the Unenviable Dilemma," 42
MICH. L. REV. 803 at 812 et seq. (1944).
181
From Franklin D. Roosevelt's First Inaugural Address.
" ••• Johnson, despite his preaching against fear, was himself fearful of the
'public Eye' which might look behind the curtain." From Levin, "Mr. Justice William
Johnson, Creative Dissenter," 43 MICH. L. REv. 497 at 519 (1944).,Anthropologists
are familiar with the phenomenon of the all-seeing eye which is almost universal
amongst primitive peoples and represents, psychologically, the critical censorship of
society. See, for example, 1 ERNEST CRAWLEY, THE MYSTIC ],losE 149 (1927) where
the "world-wide belief in the 'evil eye'" is discussed; and see also other references
in the index, and references to the evil eye in W. N. RIVERS, THE ToDAS 263 and
elsewhere (1906); in EDWARD B. TYLOR, RESEARCHES JNTO THE EEARLY HISTORY
OF MANKIND 53 and 134 (1878); and EDGAR THURSTON, SUPERSTITIONS OF
SOUTHERN INDIA 109 et seq. ( I 912). It 'should be pointed out here that the evil
eye is not the only symbol of the critical faculty of society; the evil tongue is also
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C. Comparison Between the Minds of Johnson and
Benjamin Franklin
A number of great minds of Johnson's time had already begun to
question the fearsome mental hold of the metaphysical. While we think
of Benjamin Franklin as a scientist and a great politician for the
cause of the colonies and later of the United States, f_!;!w have remembered that mankind has rarely--certainly, only in a very few instances
-produced a mind so objective, so devoid of inner fears and turmoils,
at a time when it was most needed for the welfare of the struggling
colonies and mankind. Franklin's mind synthesized where others
separated and escaped into their own-made compartments. Without
this unique capacity for observation of human conduct with the same
glasses used to observe physical phenomena it is doubtful whether the
democratic;: revolution of 1776 would have been successful. The influence of Franklin's mind on his time was immense and immeasurable.
Nor may we overlook the fact here that he had, even before Johnson's birth, set up in Charleston, South Carolina, Johnson's birthplace
and home, a branch of hi~ printing business and established the South
Carolina Gazette,1 82 and that lectures on electricity and magnetism and
the scientific discoveries of Franklin were given there. 188 Since Franklin
·had a habit, openly or anonymously, of having his own essays and
treatises printed, his thoughts, no doubt, were widely circulated.
Johnson became a member of the American Philosophical Society
which had been founded by Benjamin Franklin. The spread of knowledge through the influence of this society remained at all times one
of the main intellectual interests of Franklin's life.
One may not speak of early American thinking without considering
the contribution of Franklin and, therefore, one may not consider the
Constitution and its jurisprudence without evaluating his additions to
the cultural thought of his day-and of all time. And for the same
feared and magically counteracted. Id. l 20. In England, and in some qf the American
colonies a woman could be convicted of being a "common scold" and severely punished
-a recognition of the fear of the evil tongue. EARLE, CuRious PUNISHMENTS OF
BYGONE DAYS II et seq. (1896). The casting of the "evil eye" was often charged in
the prosecution of the Salem witch cases and elsewhere in the colonies.
182
VAN DoREN, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 106, II6, II7 (1938). A separate partnership was set up in Charleston.
See recent reference to Benjamin Franklin as the one who was "responsible for
framing our Constitution" in the opinion of Justice Jackson in Cramer v. United States,
(U.S: 1944) 89 L. Ed. 937, 945, 949, 976.
188 See Levin, "Mr. Justice William Johnson, Creative Dissenter," 43 MICH,
L. REV. 497 at 503, note 18 (1944).
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reason we must recognize the identities of thought between Franklin
and Johnson who, in jurisprudence, stood for opening the avenues of
knowledge. To understand Franklin helps one to understand Johnson
and his efforts toward a scientific view of jurisprudence.
Some years before Erasmus Darwin and Jeremy Bentham, Benjamin Franklin had already written, and himself printed, in 1725,
A Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity, Pleasure and Pain wherein
he remarked that "to cease to think is but little different from ceasing
to be." 184 This may be compared with Holmes' later statement that
"to know is not less than to feel"; as Franklin's later statement that
"those who feel can best judge" 185 might be compared with Holmes'
remark: "For to live is to function."
"The great uncertainty I found in metaphysical reasonings disgusted me," Franklin once complained, "and I quitted that kind of
reading and study for others more satisfactory." 186 Van Doren, discussing the year 1732, appropriately comments that, "Troubled by.
neither metaphysics nor lust, he turned from introspection to 'more
satisfactory studies.' " 187 In appraising his mind, his discerning biographer has emphasized the synthesizing and consolidating quality of
that remarkable intellect. "His inquiring temper," he says, "did not
call for isolation," 188 and, elsewhere Van Doren happily characterizes
his mind as "a federation of purposes, working harmoniously together." 189
What especially interests us here is that Franklin's principal aim
as a civilian was to "improve the common stock of knowledge." 190
And if he may be said to have had a paramount guiding principle it
was, "Let the experiment be made." 191 This was not with him an
aphoristic affectation, but rather the essence of his dynamism, for he
believed in 1756 that, "As yet, the quantity of human knowledge bears
no proportion to the quantity of human ignorance." 192 Nor is there
occasion, yet, for abandoning this view, either as too extreme or entirely inapplicable.
We can understand, therefore, why this man should have become
184
VAN DoREN, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, 51-52 (1938). A number of the eminent
thinkers of that period were concerned with the relationship of pleasure and pain to
human thought. See Levin, "Mr. Justice William Johnson, Creative Dissenter," 43
MICH. L. REv. 497 at 534 et seq. (1944).
185
VAN DoREN, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 749 (1938).
186

Id. IOI.
Id. II5.
188 Jd. 140.
189 Id. l 29.
187

Id. 139.
Jd. 159, 160.
192 Id. 271.

190
191
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critical of his own hypotheses and confess himself on occasion as
"ashamed that I express myself in so positive a manner." 198 He practiced upon himself what he had said earlier: "When the natural weakness and imperfection of human understanding is considered, the unavoidable influence of education, custom, books and company upon our
ways of thinking, I imagine a man must have a good deal of vanity
who believes, and a good deal of boldness who affirms, that all doctrines he holds are true, and all he rejects are false." After adding that
the same may be justly said of every sect, church and society of men
when they assume "infallibility" to themselves he to;uched on a dynamic fact of significance when he went on to say, "I think opinions
should be judged of by their influences and effects. .•• "m He modestly and candidly confessed, "I own I have too strong a penchant to the
building of hypotheses; they indulge my natural indolence. I wish
I had more of your [John Perkins] patience and accuracy in making
observations, on which alone true philosophy can be founded." 195 According to his biographer he "steadily insisted on the need for painstaking experiments, scrupulous accuracy, and a stubborn refusal to
surmise what the tested facts did not warrant." 196 Franklin once
observed that "all philosophical experiments that let light into the
nature of things, tend to increase the power of man over matter, and
multiply the conveniences or pleasures of life...." 197 But it was too
much to expect so pioneering a mind to be consciously interested in
the psychological why of things. Though his ·whole life was engaged
,both in speculation and experiment he did not consider it "of much importance to us to know the rr{anner in which nature executes her laws:
'tis enough if we know the laws themselves." He admitted, accordingly, that he was not concerned in how an object (china) comes to fall
· and why it breaks; these were matters of speculation.198 Franklin had
enough to do by his own effort without being too much concerned with
man's slow development of his ability to deal with facts.
However, despite his own denial Franklin had an unusual insight
into the motivations of human behavior due to his ability to observe ·
scientifically in both the social and the physical world~ rare combinaId. 157.
Id. 135. (Italics the writer's.) See discussion of Johnson's comparable view
in jurisprudence in Levin, "Mr. Justice William Johnson and the Unenviable
Dilemma," 42 MrcH. L. REv. at 814, and discussions of this sµbject elsewhere in
this -article.
195
VAN DoREN, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 168 (1938). (Italics the writer's.)
196 Id. 171.
197 Id. 139.
lPS Id. 160:-161.
19s
194

1945}

JUSTICE JOHNSON

tion. This is well illustrated by his co~ment on the attitude of mankind toward inventions. This is especially appropriate not only because
Muller v. Oregon drew inspiration from the practice of patent law
but because Franklin recognized the inventive faculty as one of the
common incidents of mankind; and because the. provision of the Constitution relating to the subject of inventors has by a combination of
congressional laws, judicial decisions and glaring misuses of the patent
system been interpreted to mean what Franklin had deprecated. The
why of such an unusual result is suggested in a letter to John Lining,
dated March 18, 1755, wherein he complained that there "are every
where a people who, being totally destitute of any inventive faculty
themselves, do not readily conceive that others may possess it." He
went on:
"They think of inventions as miracles: there might be such
formerly, but they are ceased. With these, everyone who offers a
new invention is deemed a pretender: he had it from some other
country or from some book. A man of their own acquaintance,
one who has no more sense than themselves, could not possibly, in
their opinion, have been the inventor of anything. They are confirmed, too, in these sentiments by frequent instances of pretensions to invention which vanity is daily producing. That vanity
too, though an incitement to invention, is at the same time the
pest of inventor~. Jealousy and envy deny the merit or the novelty
of your invention; but vanity, when the novelty and merit are
established, claims it for its own.... Thus through envy, jealousy,
and the vanity of competitors for fame, the origin of many of
the most extraordinary inventions, though produced within but a
few centuries past, is involved in 4oubt and uncertainty. We
scarce know to whom we are indebted for the compass and for
spectacles; nor have even paper and printing, that record everything else, been able to preserve with certainty the name and
reputation of their inventors. One would not, therefore, of all
faculties or qualities of the mind, wish for a friend or child that
he should have that of invention. For his attempts to benefit
mankind in that way, however well imagined, if they do not
succeed, expose him, though very unjustly, to general ridicule
and contempt; and if they do succeed, to envy, robery, and
abuse." 199
Thus, did one of the most creative and useful minds of all time-that
of a man of whom it was said that "he snatched the lightning from the
sky''---as long as two centuries ago, eliminate the miraculous from the
199

Id. 172-173.
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mind of man, thereby envisaging a democratic conception of creative
ability far di:fferent from the restricted "fl.ash of genius doctrine'' which
prevails today. The reverse has now been accomplished by judicial
decision, namely, that knowledge and skill are the sign of the commonplace and that the one who toils to assimilate the knowledge of the
ages, and to create by reason of it, cannot be deemed to be an inventor
or a creator within the meaning of the Constitution.
fond it was this same dynamic approach which condemned the rule
of the corrupt British Parliamentarians of his day for their unwillingness to abide by fact. "The Parliament," he had complained to Lord
Karnes, on April II, r767, "cannot well and wisely make laws suited
to the colonies without being properly and truly informed of their
circumstances, abilities, temp,er, etc. Thus it cannot be without repre1sentatives from thence; and yet it is fond of this power and averse to
the only means of acquiring the necessary knowledge for exercising it;
which is desiring to be omnipotent without being omniscient. ... " 200
Franklin liked the last phrase and repeated it in substance in 1773.201.
For well he· might. It is the key to all that we call civilization and
this, of course, includes j~risprudence. It belongs here because this
surely was the nucleus of Johnson's jurisprudence, the center from
which all views emerged, that is, that power without knowledge is
tyranny.
Franklin also displayed anthropological insight when he not only
urged tolerance and fair dealing for the Indians but recognized and
avowed that the Indians had played an important role in fostering the
spirit of liberty in the colonists. To the British, such imputation of
merit to the barbarians must have seemed strange but not to the inquiring mind of Franklin. The man who said at the time of the Lancaster County massacres that "the only crime of these poor wretches
seems to have been that -they had a reddish-brown skin and black
hair," 202 warned the British ministry that the Indians "have such high
ideas of per~onal liberty, and such slight ones of the value of personal
property, that they would think the disproportion monstrous between
the liberty of a man and a debt of a few shillings. . . . " 203
200

Id. 363. (Italics the writer's.)
Id. 489. Franklin paradoxically recognized the sovereignty of the crown
before the American Revolution, but rejected the despotism of Parliament. See id.
376, 377.
- 202 Id. 309.
203 Id. 365. However, accumulation of property was not always the reason. In
Queen Elizabeth's time, robbing a hawk's nest was a felony punishable by death. The
hawk was a hunting bird.
20 1.
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It may also be specially noted here, as a personal item, that Franklin was greatly admired by Major General Nathanael Greene, whose
biography was written by Johnson 204 and by the young Jeremy Bentham,205 who learned a lesson in government when he listened to Wedderburn's vicious attack on Franklin and was stunned by it.206
C. Comparison of Views of Franklin with those of
Jefferson and Bentham
Franklin's manner of thought has not been discussed as a mere
excursion. He was not a lawyer but contributed so µmch to the background of those times that the Constitution cannot be fully understood without trying to fathom the expansive viewpoint for which he
stood.
J e:fferson and Bentham, on the other hand, were students of the
law. "In this matter," states Bentham in speaking of pleasure and
pain, "we want no refinement, no metaphysics." 207 Both Bentham and
Johnson seemed to sense that "superstition, charlatanism, the spirit of
sect and party" 208 may be discovered in the somewhat more elusive
forms of logic and philosophy. Both were keen to discover "those
ardent persecutors who do evil in the spirit of holiness." 200
There can be no doubt where J e:fferson, ·who was bitterly opposed
to the use of Blackstone's Commentaries, stood on the subject of mental
refinements. When J e:fferson was anxiously seeking the ratification of
the Louisiana Purchase he wrote to John Breckinridge that he hoped
that the legislature would cast behind them "metaphysical subtleties." 210
In Ogden v. Saunders, which is rich with revelations of his mental
processes, Johnson spoke of the "metaphysical allegiance of the contract," 211 and later of the "metaphysical ideas of the British courts
on the subject of jurisdiction over contract," 212 a power which involved
a "mere mockery of justice." He was not one to be content with "the
mere shadow of justice." 213 In a later case he spoke of a mortgage of
204 Id. 623.
20s
200

Id. 468.
Id. 473.

201 BENTHAM,

THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION

Id. 8.
209 Ibid.
210
Letter dated August

3 (1931).

208

803, quoted in HENRY
33 (1943).
211
12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 213 at 362 (1827).
212 Id. at 365.
213 Id. at 280.
l 2, l
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a mere right, "a metaphysical, transitory thing." 214 Metaphysical refinement 216 and "minute discriminations drawn from the common
law" 216 were to him the means of shutting the doors of common knowledge and of suppressing the evidence of the most vital facts of life, the
common incidents of life.

1

D. The Effect of Fiction on Communication
To Johnson, law meant more than ·an index of principles to be
apotheosized and worshipped as ends in themselves. Law was to him
the means of accomplishing man's highest strivings for individual
liberty a:nd the common good. He would not permit the veil of fiction
to impede this sincere purpose.
It is because of this feeling that men conceal their motives behind
phrases and concepts that he felt that the door must not be shut to
the consideration of motives, policy and objects,217 when the legislators,
who had the right and power to enact the laws had not, although they
might have done so, made clear their whole purpose, or when the
language had to be given effect and integrated into the present. Nor
could he have overlooked the circumstance that courts often did act
according t_o unmanifested objects while at the same time they denied
their doing so and disliked makip_g the admission that anything but
pure logic governed legal situations. His. hope for greater candor was
itself beyond immediate realization. Possibly the difficulty of the task
helped him to arrive at a view of the judicial function which led him
to look first to the communication itself, whether it be a constitution,
a patent, a charter, a statute, a contract, a sentence or a word. These
were ~he· "positive" enactments which derive from the people.. TJ;ie
people musf be helped where they have failed but not thwarted when
they have spoken. "There is nothing which, on the face of the constitution," Johnson pointed out in Ogden v. Saunders, "bears the
semblance of direct prohibition on the states to exercise this power; and
it would seem strange, that, if such a prohibition had been in the contemplation of the convention, when appropriating an entire section to
the enumeration of prohibitions on _the states, they had forgotten this,
Conrad v. Atlantic Ins. Co., I Pet. (26 U.S.) 386 at 451 (1828).
5 Pet. (30 U.S.) 518 at 525 {1831).
216 See quotation from Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. (21 U.S.) I at 104 (1823),
in -Levin, "Mr. Justice William Johnson and the Common Incidents of Life: I," 44
M1cH. L. REv. 59 at 98 (1945).
214
215

Marshall also spoke out against the "refined and the metaphysical reasoning''
which would explain away the Constitution and leave it "totally unfit for use." Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (22 'U.S.) 1 at 222 (1824).
217 12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) 213 at 284 (1827). Seep. 252, supra.
,
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if they had intended to enact it." 218 The starting point had to be the
common meaning of the symbols employed, as when Johnson said,
" •.. we shall search in vain, in the constitution of the state or the
United States, or even in the principles of common right, for any provision or principles to impugn them." 219 Here Johnson backs up the
symbols used with that indefinable source of human experience called
"common right," but his first effort is to understand the communicated
language. Much confusion has accumulated through the ages in regard
to the interpretation of written instruments or declarations because of
the frequent disregard of the fact that communication, be it by language
or other symbols, and even by unconscious actions, is the most common
of all human facts and experiences.
Let us consider again, for purposes of illustration, patent law, particularly as practiced at the time our Constitution was enacted. Patents
were declared void in England and Amerisa for reasons which were
apparent on their face. 220 They were literae patentes, open-faced, to
start with, hence, there was no reason to go over that ground again
except where clarification was required. The patent, whether for land
or for an invention, was a communication which largely spoke for
itself, whether issued by the Crown in England, or by the officers of
the United States. Charters, too, were patents and so, in a sense, any
constitution or corporate charter is a patent. Patents in England were
issued as a protest against secret acts of monopoly, although they involved grants of exclusive rights. They were strong instruments devised to combat monopolies, although the vision of this fact is now
obscured by the prevailing unwarranted and distorted notion that patents are evil things. Not only was there no power without legislative
authority to review patents judicially, once issued and valid on their
face, but there was no reason to do so. They were open communicaOgden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. (25 U.S.) at 274-275 (1827).
Lessee of Livingston v. Moore, 7 Pet. (32 U.S.) 469 at 546 (1833).
220
See dissent of Mr. Justice Livingston-Mr. Justice William Johnson also
dissenting--in Evans v. Eaton, 7 Wheat;(20 U.S.) 356 at 435 (1822). The majority
opinion was by Mr. Justice Story. See also dissent of Mr. Justice Miller in Mahn v.
Harwood, 112 U.S. 354 at 364, 6 S.Ct. 451 (1884); also GoosoN, A PRACTICAL
TREATISE ON THE LAw OF PATENTS AND INVENTIONS 189-192 (1832) and other
texts current prior to the middle of the last century. A step in the direction of correcting a negative attitude toward invention was recently taken when the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided Bulldog Electric Products Co. v.
Cole Electric Products Co., Inc. and Westinghouse Electric and Mfg. Co., decided
on April 17, 1945. The court held that even though the bill of complaint should be
dismissed for failure to disclaim, the district coutt could not decree the patent in
issue "void" since the proceeding was not in rem.
218

219
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tions. Hence, to insist on first exhausting the meaning of the communication did not invite the attack of "literalism." Fraud in the
issuance of a patent was realistically dealt with in a separate scire f acias
proceeding wherein there was ample scope for the investigation of
fraudulent or illegal motives. It was when there was a failure to relate
the communication to the- common incidents of life that literality
choked out the facts. Literality, then, became one with superstition,
magic, unreality and metaphysical abstraction-in the disapproved
sense.
But even the claimed finality of foreign judicial judgments, which
also were taken on their face, derived force from common experience.
So we find Johnson insisting with vigor that the decisions of foreign
courts of condemnation "do not derive their effect from their abstract
justice; they are in this respect analogies to the acts of sovereignty.
They are universally conclusive, because nowhere subject to revision." 221
E. Primitive Magic, Science and Magical Scientists
We must recall again that our Constitution was enacted when
magical thinking had become a pattern with those who carried out the
common law system. The growth of human freedom as an achievement of civilization had been accomplished at the cost of the mental
subordination of peoples-a process which may have been inevitable
at the earlier stages of development. While it has often been asserted
that science grew out of primitive magic, nevertheless science, even as
we know it today, tends to pull back in that direction and is yet not
many degrees removed from it. A partial evaluation of magic-partial
because purely intellectual-_-which describes magic as the primitive
habit of discovering similarities, whether real or imagined, and then
permits the mind to become dominated by these likenesses, is enough
to warn those interested in the expansion of the understanding of mental processes in all phases of lifo that scientists have been too ready,
most often unconsciously, to be caught off guard by the tendency to
create a belief out of a particular finding. When these magical or scientific findings of fact become determinisms which stop the free expression
and action of the mind they are both equally identifiable as repetitive
surrogates of authority. The quest for uniformity then becomes a
personal emotional security pattern rather than an objective pursuit.
One need not look for a better example than the belief which developed out o\ Franklin's discoveries in the field ~f the physical scie.nces
221

Rosee v. Himely, 4.Cranch (8 U.S.) 241 at 285 (1808).

1 945}

JUSTICE JOHNSON

that he was a "mysterious wizard, taming lightning, stilling waves";
and even "the British ministry shared the superstition." 222
"If we analyze the principles of thought on which magic is based,"
says Sir James Frazer, "they will probably be found to resolve themselves into two: first, that like produces like, or that an effect resembles
its cause; and, second, that things which have once been in contact
with each other continue to act on each other at a distance after the
physical contact has been severed. . . . From the first of these principles, namely, the Law of Similarity, the magician infers that he can
produce any effect he desires merely my imitating it: from the second
( the Law of Contact or Contagion) he infers that whatever he does
to a material object will affect equally the person with whom the
object was once in contact, whether it formed part of his body or
not .... In short, magic is a spurious system of natural law as well as
a fallacious guide of conduct; it is a false science as well as an abortive
art." 228 The application, according to Frazer, of the principle that
like produces like "is the attempt which has been made by many
peoples in many ages to injure or destroy an enemy by injuring or
destroying an image of him, in the belief that, just as the image
suffers, so does the man, and that when it perishes he must die." m
Thus, an Indian believes he can draw an image in the sand and by
pricking it with a sharp stick he can inflict a corresponding injury to the
person represented.225 One of the most interesting examples, which
illustrates the tendency to hold on to the findings once made, even
after civilization has given up the earlier practice, occurred in ancient
Rome where it was the custom for the Pontifex Maximus to supervise
the casting of the superannuated old men into the Tiber just before
commencing a migration. As time went on, this manner of treating
the aged and infirm was abandoned, but the wish to reenact the ancient
custom did not cease, for the Romans went through the ceremony of
tossing small sculptured figures representing old men over the bridge
into the waters of the river. This is, of course, also true of the substitution in ancient times of animal sacrifice for human sacrifice.
If we conceive of precedents in this sense, then the magical connection between the old and the new still remains, whether we call it
natural law or the science of the law. But all of magical thought as
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well as science, as generally understood, presupposes that somehow or
other this thing called "uniformity," which is another term for science,
will guide us. In this respect even some anthropologists have been
largely remiss, since th.ey have resisted efforts to probe into the psychodynamic causes which give rise to the particular uniformities observed
by scientists. Some have actually given up the struggle by finding too
secure a refuge in the idea of original or inherited behavior-a simple
way of slamming shut the door to further unsettling inquiries into
environmental causes of a psychodynamic character.
The integration of knowledge, whether it be in the case of law or in
the material sciences, has so far lagged behind because of a lack of interest in the understanding of the emotional causes and psychodynamic
reasons which give rise to the quest for similarities, so much so that
the situation may be described as a major tragedy of history. Benjamin Franklin once complained to Priestley: " ... if I could once more
recover the leisure to search with you into the works of nature; I mean
the inanimate not the animate or inoral part of them: the more I discovered of the former the more I admired them; the more I know of
the latter the more I am disgusted with them." 226 He complained that
he "was born too soon" and added: "It is .impossible to imagine the height to which may be carried, in a thousand years, the power of man
over matter •... 0 that moral science were in as fair a way of improvement, that men would cease to be wolves to one anothe~, and that
human beings would at length learn what they now improperly call
humanity." 221

XI
THE STRUGGLE FOR ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE

A. Principles as Excluding Means
No human can doubt the value of principles as means_of accomplishing greater understanding. This is true in economics, mathematics,
language, law or any branch of science. The high road of principles
has been, however, the mechanism of the epigram, the aphorism or the
simple truism which temporarily solves a situation of conflict by excluding all other knowledge and "fences in" the emotions. The most
prevalent sign of pessimism throughout the world, without exception,
is the resistance to the study of th.ose psychodynamic facts which may
be called the common incidents of the mind. Any effort, with a few
226
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exceptions, even to inject into discussion this most common of all elements, invites the same emotional attack that was once discharged
toward a heretic or dissenter in the days of the Inquisition.
Various stigmata are commonly employed to reach a quick decision
over such non-conformists. A common term applied is the word "realist"--and there are others--as if all of life were not a fusion of
reality, generality and the ideal. And what is saddest of all is that
many of such "realists" can thank their "unrealistic" critics for the
environmental dominance which throws them with such vehemence
into the opposition. The fact is that the term "realist'" is misunderstood and misapplied. When we consider the condensation of emotional energy deposited in the word, it is well for us to know that there
is further insight to be gained. In the science of psychodynamics,
reality deals with the adjustment of the growing child to his cultural
environment; it is in direct contrast to the destructive wishes of an
earlier period. Today, the one who opposes is called a realist; tomorrow he is called an idealist. Both are considered disturbers of the peace
of mind. Critics employ the term as the equivalent of the repudiation.
o.f attention to observation of fact.
Therefore, we see that jurisprudence must keep the door open for
further evidence. Indeed, there has never been a time when civilization has not struggled with the admission and exclusion of evidence.
To recognize the need for compulsion at our present stage is one thing,
but it is another to assume, as Justice F,rankfurter has done, that, "Law
is concerned with external behavior and not with the inner Zife of man.
It rests in large measure upon compulsion." 228 The fact is that we see
indications that there is a prevalent anxiety about the lack of concern
of the law with the very core of that with which the law deals-the life
of man. One need but be aware of the admitted concern about the
mental rehabilitation of men and wom~n who have and will return
from war, and the fear that the law will not be adequate to deal with
the problem and to realize that these are not times to think mainly of
prohibitions. Judges speak freely today, as Marshall and Story and
Johnson and others did in their day, of the "feelings" and "passions" of
men and of that "confidence" which is required to insure competent
government. Yet is it almost universally assumed that the science of
human emotions can be "played by ear" by the lawyers, judges and
jurists.
228
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B. Insufficiency Today of Closed-Door Theories About Law
In the same issue of a recent number of a prominent law journal
we find two explanations of the origin and nature of the law so directly
at variance with one another as to rule out any possible charge of
partisanship. Rather, it would appear that the definitions'reflect differences in the effort to understand the inner life of man. "Law," says
the one, "is not the same thing as brotherly love. Its life, as Von
Jhering so truly observed, is struggle. The most we can hope to
achieve is, employing Professor Carr's expression, to substitute 'the
counting of heads for the breaking of heads' ...." 229 Dean Pound, who
expresses the other view, quite vigorously criticizes modern trends in
jurisprudence because he :finds force as the evil of the new trend. He
says: "In the so-called realist theory which refers everything in politics
and law ultimately to the force exercised by those who wield the authority of politically organized society, there are no rights. Law is
simply a body of threats of exercise of governmental force, and the
making and enforcing of these threats are relative to the personalities
of those who exercise the force. Rights are but an illegitimate inference
from threats." 230 That we agree with Dean Pound in his present coRdemnation of the theory of compulsion is already clear from what we
have said. What appears as challenging here is, however, the antipodal
perspective of these two philosophies and the almost complete obliviousness to the need to' discover the reasons for such differences or to
apply such scientific knowledge as is already available.
As Dean Pound and others have said, we live here under the idea
of "supremacy of the law," a concept which has made possible the
greatest advances in the sciences the world has ever known. It is to
little purpose to contend, as some have done, that the Constitution is
not law when the discussion revolves around a closed concept of law
which is itself final. But we pause to think when we read Dean
Pound's comment on the nature of rights: "We need not argue for
229
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natural rights, eternal and inviolable established in the very nature of
the universe. If we can't put them any higher, we can at least put
rights as reasonable expectations involved in civilized life, which long
experienoe and the reasoned judgment of mankind have established
and recognized." 231 May we not here ask whether these references to
"reasonable expectations," "long expetience" and "reasoned judgment" are not the very focal points where, without careful training,
individual force may be concealed or rationalized? Is it not requii:ed,
then, that we develop a science of judging these common incidents of
life? If we do not, is not our government continuallr in danger of
becoming a more personal government of intuitive men rather than
of laws-men who are often unaware of their own use of force?
CONCLUSION

Johnson produced no simple formula for the meaning of law. He
did, however, see .that the law had to discard the excluding methods
inherited from a superstitious past. The century which followed his
ascension to the Supreme Court bench paid little attention to what he
had said. The theory of exclusion and its repressive influence was dominant, and is still largely in effect. We have yet much to learn about
the common incidents of life. Without a sincere devotion to the study
of the psychodynamic origin and development of institutions as an
outgrowth of the "Study of Man" there is only further darkness ahead.
This, at least, we can be "certain" of.
In his last message, which was undelivered because of his untimely
death, President Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote: "If civilization is to
survive, we must cultivate the science of human relationships-the
ability of all peoples, of all kinds, to live together and work together,
in the same world of peace." Jurisprudence has its responsibilities to
assume in such a project.
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